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ABSTRACT 
 
POTENTIALS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO UNIVERSAL, SCHOOL-BASED 
SCREENING FOR BEHAVIORAL AND EMOTIONAL RISK:  
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS  
OF CURRENT CASE LAW 
by 
Natasha D. Gardner 
 
 
Disproportionality, the over- or underrepresentation of a particular group compared to its 
presence in a population, in special education is a long-standing issue (Dunn, 1968; U.S. 
Department of Education, 2006; Waitoller, Artiles, & Cheney, 2010). Some scholars have 
proposed group or universal screening for emotional and behavioral risk in schools as a 
method of addressing disproportionality (Adelman & Taylor, 1999; Weist, Evans, & 
Lever, 2003). Notwithstanding the public health implications of disproportionality, 
considering previous case law, questions exist as to the legality of such screening 
programs in public schools (Doe v. Heck, 2003; Fields v. Palmdale, 2005). The purpose 
of this inquiry was to apply critical discourse analysis (CDA) to the federal case of 
Rhoades v. Penn-Harris (2008) to explore how court discourse reflects issues of social 
power and multidisciplinarity in the context of a school mental health screening program. 
CDA has roots in the postmodernist perspective that scholarly discourse is socially 
influenced and consequential (Weis & Wodak, 2003). CDA is usually interdisciplinary 
and primarily focused on explaining discourse structures related to social problems and 
may be applied from various theoretical frameworks and methodologies (Titscher, 
Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000; Weis & Wodak; Wodak, 2001). This study used 
discourse-historical approach to address the following questions: In Rhoades how are 
persons and entities referred to and what characteristics and qualities are attributed to 
them? How does this case organize relative power relationships between social actors? 
What arguments are used to legitimize conclusions about the screening program at issue? 
From what knowledge bases are these arguments expressed-legal, psychological or both? 
Case study data were collected from LexisNexus Academic and Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER), an online public access service, using criterion sampling 
and consisted of the two Rhoades federal district court opinions and various party 
pleadings. Interpretations were generated from a three-level data analysis (Titscher, 
Meyer, Wodak, & Vetter, 2000). Findings indicated that the court's use of various 
argumentation strategies in its discourse on student mental health screening presented 
varying potential duties and liabilities for entities and individuals involved in such 
programs. Additionally, although mental health screening in public schools requires an 
interdisciplinary approach in development and evaluation, the court's discussion of the 
program litigated in Rhoades used a centrist, law-based perspective, suggesting that 
attempts to facilitate a pluralist or an integrationist approach to such cases may require 
efforts particular to legal, as opposed to clinical, practice. Recommendations for 
developing school mental health screening programs sensitive to issues addressed by 
Rhoades are provided. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SCHOOL-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SCREENING AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO 
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 
The disproportionate representation of linguistic and cultural minorities in special 
education, concisely termed disproportionality, is a long-standing national problem in the 
United States (Westat, 2003). Disproportionality has been defined as the over- or under-
representation of culturally or linguistically different students in educational classification, 
placement, and access to educational programs, resources, and services and as “unequal 
proportions of culturally diverse students in special education programs” (Artiles & Trent, 
2000, p. 514). Oswald, Coutinho, Best, and Singh (1999) defined disproportionate 
representation as “the extent to which membership in a given ethnic, socioeconomic, 
linguistic, or gender group affects the probability of being placed in a specific disability 
category” (p. 198). Skiba et al. (2008) define disproportionality as “the representation of a 
group in a [special education] category that exceeds our expectations for that group or differs 
substantially from the representation of others in that category” (p. 266). These varied 
definitions are based on the assumption that if a sample of children were assigned randomly 
to various educational categories, the cultural and linguistic demographics of these categories 
should closely resemble the demographics of the group from which the children were 
selected; however, in actuality, special education group demographics significantly differ 
from their populations. Specifically, some groups are consistently over- or underrepresented 
and certain group memberships, rather than actual need or deficit, may affect one’s disability 
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category placement. Thus, in violation of the randomness and equality assumption, when 
compared to other groups or their presence in the population, some groups are significantly 
over- or underrepresented in certain special education categories. 
Initially brought to the fore of special education research by Dunn’s (1968) seminal 
work, early studies suggested 60 to 80% of students in classes for intellectually disabled 
students were from culturally and linguistically different (CLD) groups. In 1979, the National 
Research Council [NRC; 1980] was commissioned to examine factors related to the over-
representation of males and minorities in special education programs and identify criteria and 
practices that would not disproportionately affect these groups. In the 1980s, the U.S. 
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights began publishing disproportionality 
estimates, which have remained relatively consistent (Chinn & Hughes, 1987; Donovan & 
Cross, 2002; Finn, 1982).  
Recent estimates from the U.S. Department of Education (2006) indicate that CLD 
students remain overrepresented in so-called high-incidence categories of emotional and 
behavioral disorders (EBD), learning disabilities (LD), mental retardation or intellectual 
disability (MR), and speech and language impairment (SLI). Continuing disproportionality in 
special education, especially in the EBD category, is well documented (Guiberson, 2009; 
Skiba et al., 2008; Waitoller, Artiles, & Cheney, 2010). By comparison, in low-incidence 
categories (deaf, blind, orthopedic impairment, etc.) where the problem is easily observed 
outside of school context and typically diagnosed by a medical professional, there is no 
significant disproportionality. 
At the national level, African American students are generally overrepresented in 
both general special education services and in the specific MR and EBD categories (U.S. 
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Department of Education, 2006; see Table 1 in Skiba et al., 2008). By some national 
estimates, African American public school students account for 33% of students identified 
with MR, a number discrepant from their 17% representation in the school-age population 
(Donovan & Cross, 2002). In the EBD category, at least one study found African American 
students were represented at about 160% of the expected rate (National Center for 
Educational Statistics, 2003); however, disproportionality is not limited to African American 
students. 
State-level data show a correlation between risk of special education identification 
and different demographic groups (Westat, 2003). Oswald et al. (2001) found that compared 
to White and African American students, Latinos and Latinas were underrepresented in the 
MR category. According to the National Center for Educational Statistics (2003), within the 
EBD category, only American Indian/Alaskan Native students were proportionately 
represented. African American and White students were disproportionality overrepresented, 
while Asian or Pacific Islander students and Hispanic students were disproportionality 
underrepresented. Such high rates of disproportionality have led some scholars to assert that 
EBD classification is particularly problematic for African American students (Osher, 
Cartledge, Oswald, Artiles, & Coutinho, 2004). Hosp and Reschly (2003) found that African 
American and Latino and Latina students were referred more often for special education than 
their White counterparts. In some states, including California, Latinos and Latinas are 
overrepresented in the LD and SLI categories (Artiles, Rueda, Salazar, & Higareda, 2005; 
National Center for Culturally Responsive Education Systems [NCCREDt; 2006]). Thus, 
disproportionality has implications for all students. 
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Contributions to Disproportionality 
What causes disproportionality? Admittedly, disproportionality is a very complex 
issue and likely arises from various factors functioning independently and in concert such 
that data on its causes are unclear and inconsistent (Abidin & Robinson, 2002; Coutinho & 
Oswald, 1998; Hosp & Reschley, 2003; Lau et al., 2004; National Research Council, 2002; 
Osher et al., 2004; Oswald et al.,1998; Yeh, Forness, Ho, McCabe, & Hough, 2004). Heller 
et al. (1982) categorized potential explanations for disproportionality into six rubrics: legal 
and administrative policies that fund particular disabilities, students’ individual 
characteristics, quality of student instruction, assessment bias against student language and 
culture, student contextual factors such as family and community characteristics, and 
historical processes affecting cultural minorities. Incorporating Heller et al.’s rubrics, 
Coutinho and Oswald (2000) propose two hypotheses on disproportionality. First, various 
social and demographic factors, such as poverty, community factors, and availability of 
appropriate general education options disproportionately affect minority students (Fujiura & 
Yamaki, 2000, Messick, 1984; U.S. Department of Education, 1998; Utley & Obiakor, 
2001). Second, cultural biases within the public education system disproportionately affect 
minority students during the referral, assessment, and eligibility processes (Harry, Rueda, & 
Kalyanpur, 1999; Trent & Artiles, 1995; Utley & Obiakor, 2001). Thus, disproportionality is 
affected by contextual or sociodemographic factors in addition to systemic factors, such as 
educator or system bias.  
Research also indicates that special education referrals may be affected by differences 
in school structure and resources. Factors such as school funding and teacher quality, as well 
as school reforms like disciplinary procedures and high-stakes testing, have been linked to 
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disproportionality (Losen & Orfield, 2002). School culture and attitudes and values held by 
staff and administration may affect also disproportionality (Osher, Woodruff, & Sims, 2002). 
Research shows that ELL students in schools offered the least language support services 
were likely to be referred for special education (Artiles, Rueda, Salazar, & Higareda, 2005). 
Another study found that if educators viewed special education services as the only resource 
available for helping struggling students, they were willing to over-refer to increase access to 
resources (Skiba et al., 2006). Harry and Kligner (2006) suggest that support institutional 
factors, such as teacher quality, class size, and programming available for minority and 
special education, significantly influenced special education referrals. Coutinho, Oswald, & 
Best (2002) conclude that identification processes for identification work differently for 
different groups, suggesting possible inadvertent or deliberate bias (See also Coutinho, 
Oswald, Best, & Forness, 2002). 
Student functioning, the datum used to determine educational placement, results from 
interactions between the child, teacher and academic environment, specifically, interactions 
between student biology, family and community experiences, and instructional environment 
(National Research Council, 2002). According to the U.S. Department of Education (2007), 
83% or more of general educational teachers are White, but current training methods may 
insufficiently prepare teachers to understand or effectively work with students’ cultural and 
language differences in ways that facilitate academic achievement (Delpit, 2006; Ladson-
Billings, 1994, 1997; Meyer & Patton, 2001; Ortiz, Wilkinson Robertson-Courtney, & 
Kushner, 2006). Some posit that educator bias in special education identification, especially 
for EBD placement, may result from aversion to or less tolerance for diverse feelings and 
behaviors exhibited by minority students, over-reporting of the severity of such issues, and 
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use of behavior rating scales that solicit the rater’s perceptions of groups of which they are 
less tolerant (Elliott & Busse, 2004; Merrell, 2003). Thus, issues with teacher referral for 
behavioral problems may be influenced by “cultural gaps and misunderstandings” left 
unfilled by current teacher training (Skiba et al., 2006). 
Additionally, evidence suggests that processes used to identify children for special 
education services may not be equally applied to all racial/ethnic groups (Heller et al., 1982). 
This misapplication may be attributable to various demographic factors. Shinn, Tindal, and 
Spira (1987) in their examination of teacher referrals for students in second through fourth 
grade using curriculum-based measures found teachers were more likely to refer African 
American students than White students based on those results. Similarly, Gottlieb, Gottlieb, 
and Trongue (1991) found teachers referred minority children more often than nonminority 
children and tended to refer minority students for behavioral issues rather than academic 
problems.  
Why Address Disproportionality? 
Disproportionality of concern if the process of special education identification is 
flawed or results in students’ being placed in inappropriate educational settings (Heller et al., 
1982). When it results in under-representation, disproportionality means students in need are 
not identified and consequently do not receive services needed for academic progress 
(Bollmer, Bethel, Garrison-Mogren & Brauen, 2007; Klingner et al., 2005). In theory, 
overrepresentation may provide students additional supports but may also carry lowered 
expectation from teachers, other students, and the identified student, resulting in a trade-off 
between supports and costs that should be considered in identification and placement 
decisions (National Research Council, 2002). Compared to students in general education, 
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children receiving special education services have significantly lower academic achievement; 
Wagner, Newman, Cameto, Levine, and Garza (2006) found persistent gaps in mathematics, 
science, social studies, and language arts achievement. Similarly, using data from the 
National Assessment of Education Programs, Cortiella (2007) found that differences between 
general and special education achievement ranged from 20 to 61 points and that disabled 
students performed an average of 32 points lower than general education students. When 
compounded by cultural differences, such achievement gaps raise questions of the equity of 
in special education (Artiles, Kozleski, Trent, Osher, & Ortiz, 2010). 
Special education identification can involve placing students in restrictive settings. 
Research suggests that minority students tend to be placed in more restrictive special 
education environments than their White peers (Fierros & Conroy, 2002; Serwatka, Deering, 
& Grant, 1995; Skiba et al., 2006; U.S. Department of Education Office of Special Programs, 
2002, p. III-45). Compared to White students, African American students are half as likely to 
be placed in general education settings (National Institute for Urban School Improvement, 
2008). This effect holds even when racially different students have the same disability 
classification (Cartledge, Singh, & Gibson, 2008). Additionally, compared to their White 
peers in the same disability categories, culturally and linguistically diverse students in special 
education more often are removed from school, receive fewer vocational and occupational 
services, and are less likely to enter college (Henderson, 2001; Osher et al., 2002; Parrish, 
2002). In contrast, examining placements from the Special Education Elementary 
Longitudinal Study database of more than 11,000 students, Blackorby et al. (2005) found that 
special education students who spent more time in general education settings had higher 
achievement scores, had fewer absences, and performed closer to grade-level than students in 
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more restrictive settings. These results support Hosp and Reschly’s (2003) concern regarding 
the inequitable labeling effects of restrictive placements for minority students and indicate 
that inappropriate identification and placement may present particular long-term educational 
risks for minority students. 
Disproportionality and Federal Law 
Disproportionality not only affects student outcomes but also has federal implications 
for schools. Both the 1997 reauthorization of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA, 1997) and its 2004 Improvement Act (IDEA, 2004) emphasized attempts to prevent 
the worsening of problems associated with mislabeling of minority children with disabilities. 
Congress designated that disproportionality resulting from inappropriate identification 
constitutes an important monitoring priority (34 CFR 300.600(d)(3)). The IDEA requires that 
all states receiving certain federal funds collect and examine student data to determine if 
significant racial/ethnic disproportionality is occurring in the identification of children with 
disabilities or impairments at the state and local levels whether in setting placement or 
disciplinary actions, such as suspension and expulsions (34 CFR 300.646(a)). Qualifying 
states must provide data disaggregated by race and ethnicity and quantifiable indicators of 
disproportionality where such representation results from inappropriate identification; they 
also must have policies and procedures to prevent inappropriate racial/ethnic representation 
(34 CRF 300.600(d)(3)). Where significant disproportionality is found, states must review 
and, if appropriate, revise identification and placement policies and procedures, publicly 
report such changes, and reserve the maximum amount of funds to comprehensive early 
intervention services targeted toward but not limited to children from disproportionately 
represented groups (34 CRF 300.646(b); Watioller et al., 2010). At face value, the IDEA’s 
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requirement for tracking disproportionality in special education appears simple; however, 
neither the IDEA nor its regulations for implementation define significant disproportionality, 
leaving this to the states’ discretion (Skiba et al., 2008). This autonomy means there is no 
single or uniform method of measuring and addressing disproportionality. Thus, states appear 
to have broad discretion in addressing disproportionality issues. Such discretion creates an 
opportunity for school systems to implement a variety of inverventions including school-
based mental health screening programs (SBMHS); however, before such programs can be 
created, it is important to understand the impetus behind such interventions as well as their 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Methodology 
 The purpose of this literature review was to explore current research relevant to the 
potential use of SBMHS to address disproportionality in special education. Specifically, to 
examine how this intervention may be defined, the arguments for and against SBMHS, the 
pros and cons of utilizing parents and teachers as informants of student functioning, and the 
particular challenges such programs may face as a result of their multidisciplinary nature. 
The literature reviewed in this study was obtained from various electronic databases 
as generated by GALILEO, an academic search engine used by various academic institutions. 
This search engine was used to locate peer-reviewed academic journals published within the 
past 40 years, specifically addressing disproportionality in special education, mental health 
screening in public schools, and student behavior ratings. Terms used for the search included 
“disproportionality and special education;” “student testing, evaluation or screening 
informants;” and, “mental health testing, assessment, evaluation, or screening.” These 
searches yielded over 100 articles from academic journal, which were reviewed for their 
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particular relevance to the following research questions: 1) How does SBMHS fit into the 
various proposed interventions for disproportionality; 2) What does current literature note as 
potential benefits of and challenges to using SBMHS to address disproportionality; 3) What 
the advantages and disadvantages of using parents or teachers as informants in SBMHS; 4) 
What are the primary arguments presented for and against SBMHS; 5) What potential 
challenges does the multidisciplinary nature of SBMHS present for its implementation? 
Based on the information obtained from these articles, additional references such as books, 
newspaper articles, and other materials were obtained, review, and as deemed relevant, 
applied to the aforementioned research questions. 
Proposed Interventions for Disproportionality 
Proposed proactive interventions for disproportionality fall into two main categories: 
prevention and early detection (Forness, Kavale, MacMillan, Asarnow, & Duncan, 1996). As 
to prevention, Donovan and Cross (2002) recommended a national approach to offset 
socioeconomic factors that may cause children to require special education services; 
however, addressing such factors may be outside the scope of services that schools have 
traditionally or can reasonably provide. In comparison, early detection and intervention 
strategies may be more easily implemented. 
Serna, Forness, and Nielsen (1998) recommended early detection to identify student 
problems before they become matters for referral, that is, before these problems become so 
significant that they require intensive special education supports. Such a prevention and 
eligibility determination model may be implemented through school-wide screening and 
multitiered intervention strategies to identify and intervene early with children at risk for 
academic problems (Lane, 2007; National Research Council, 2002; Osher, Woodruff et al., 
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2002; Serna et al., 1998) and to connect underserved and minority children to needed mental 
health services (Lau et al., 2004).  
Mental health screening may be defined as a process used to identify risk factors or 
early features which increase the likelihood of developing psychological or behavioral 
problems and subsequently providing interventions to relevant individuals (National 
Academy of Sciences, 2009). This procedure differs from a full psychological battery or 
other types psychological evaluation in that the goal is not to obtain a diagnosis but to assess 
risk or early features of a single or multiple emotional, behavioral, or social problems. 
Screening may be conducted at the community or universal-level, which focuses on 
population risks; group-level for specific groups; and an individual-level (National Academy 
of Sciences). The information provided by such screening may vary from community 
exposure to risk, such as violence and poverty, to more personal risks, such as problematic 
behaviors or subdromal symptoms of psychological problems requiring community, group, 
or individual intervention (National Academy of Sciences). For the purposes of this review, 
mental health screening conducted in schools to assess student risk at a group or school-wide 
level is referred to as school-based mental health screening (SBMHS). 
Potential Benefits of and Challenges to Using Screening for Disproportionality 
Serna et al. (1998) proposed a primary prevention model, where support, such as 
screening, is offered to all students who are at risk, to address disproportionality. Universal 
or school-wide screening may reduce the stigma often affiliated with mental health 
assessments (National Academy of Sciences, 2009). These benefits may be particularly 
important for families facing barriers to child-focused mental health services, such as lack of 
health insurance and lack of available service providers. These challenges are especially 
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relevant for children who are members of ethnic minorities (U.S. Public Health Service, 
2000). Additionally, emotional and behavioral screening as a primary component of a 
preventative model would not change eligibility established based on students’ disability 
status but provide additional means of matching students’ specific needs to interventions 
without requiring qualification under high-incidence disability labels, such as LD and ED 
(National Research Council, 2002). 
As previously stated, if used to address disproportionality, screening programs should 
comply with IDEA reporting requirements. Salend, Gartick Duhaney, and Montgomery 
(2002) recommended that disproportionality interventions include practical ways of 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data. More specifically, Gravois and Rosenfield 
(2006) proposed that until certain interventions are shown to reduce disproportionality 
education identification reliably, continued monitoring of disaggregated data should remain 
in place to ensure these efforts are in fact affecting variables of interest. Information provided 
by examining local data on racial disparities can result in systems-level changes (Johnson, 
2002). Because school districts vary greatly in their student demographics and special 
education identification rates, data management can be a very cumbersome and complicated 
process (Bollmer et al., 2007). Adding to these complications Skiba et al. (2008) suggested 
that efforts to address disproportionality account for different factors that may uniquely 
contribute to disproportionality in various locales. Consequently, screening programs should 
provide practical data management and reporting logistics and reflect sensitivity to school 
and local demographics differences. 
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Potential Informants for Risk Screening 
In addition to issues of consent, data management, and sensitivity to local differences, 
student screening program should also consider whom to use as screener informants. Two 
obvious sources are parents and teachers. Teachers refer most children receiving special 
education services (National Research Council, 2002). Because of their unique experiences 
and contexts, teacher ratings are the primary method of assessing school behavior (Frick et 
al., 2009). Specifically, the particular demands of school and the developmental nature of 
these tasks allow teachers to detect particular problems and competencies (Frick et al.).  
The utility of teacher ratings varies in relation to parent ratings. Generally, teachers 
are more accurate than parents as reporters of symptoms of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder (Loeber, Green, & Lahey, 1990; Tripp, Schaughency, & Clark, 2006). In some 
cases, teachers also are superior to parents in their assessments of ADHD treatment efficacy 
(Biederman, Gao, Rogers, & Spencer, 2006). However, the accuracy of teacher ratings is not 
absolute. Teacher ratings are less useful for antisocial behaviors or internalizing problems 
unlikely to be observed in a classroom setting (Loeber et al., 1990). As the time teachers 
observe students varies based on their classification (i.e., elementary vs. middle or high 
school), the usefulness of teacher ratings varies with the student’s age; specifically, it may 
decrease as a child advances in school and as contact with any single teacher decreases 
(Cullinan, Osborne, & Epstein, 2004; Cullinan & Sabornie, 2004; Edelbrock, Costello, 
Dulcan, Kalas, & Conover, 1985). Additionally, although the evidence on teacher bias is 
mixed, if teachers are biased in evaluating student functioning, because of their subjectivity, 
current referral and placement procedures fail to correct such bias (National Research 
Council, 2002).  
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Mixed evidence also exists for parent reporting. Parent reports are vital sources of 
information for young children who would not be reliable self-reporters; however, their 
knowledge of adolescent functioning may be more limited (Frick et al.). Some researchers 
have found parent ratings superior to teacher ratings for certain internalizing problems such 
as anxiety and depression (Klein, Dougherty, & Olino, 2005; Silverman & Ollendick, 2005). 
Comparing referral data from school records, Gottlieb et al. (1991) found that both 
parents and teachers tended to refer students for academic reasons, and parents and teacher 
did not differ in their referral rates for behavioral reasons only. Gottlieb et al. (1991) also 
noted that the consequences of teacher versus parent referral may vary by student race. 
Specifically, African American students referred by parents had a 6.9% chance of being 
classified as emotionally disturbed compared to 29.5% referred by teachers, while 9.5% of 
White students referred by parents and 5.9% referred by teachers were similarly classified. 
Subsequent research supports the conclusion that teacher-parent discrepancies may be larger 
for African American students and Latino and Latina students than for White students 
(Fabrega, Ulrich, & Loeber, 1996; Youngstom, Loeber, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 2000; 
Zimmerman, Khoury, Vega, Gil, & Warheit, 1995).  
Despite these challenges, researchers have identified benefits to using teacher ratings. 
Daily, teachers observe behaviors relevant to student academic success and, consequently, 
they are useful measurers of possible student outcomes (Gerber & Semmel, 1984). Also, 
research suggests that across the variety of methods available for measuring teacher 
assessment of student performance, teacher ratings tend to be strongly correlated with student 
academic outcomes and to accurately differentiate students based on academic risk (Hoge & 
Coladarci, 1989; Gresham, MacMillan, & Bocian, 1997; Shinn et al., 1987). Gottlieb et al. 
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(1991) suggest that, because most special education referrals had an academic component, 
intervention should focus on improving student academic skills, as these would affect more 
children than behavioral interventions alone. Despite bias concerns, teachers provide most 
special education referrals, the information provided for such referrals is primarily based on 
students’ school-based functioning, and teacher referral tends to be more influential in 
student placement. Thus, screening for risk via teacher ratings is likely a valid method of 
accurately identifying early emotional and behavioral problems relevant to student academic 
outcomes. Considering the federal mandates regarding disproportionality, the diverse and 
significant student outcomes hinging on identification of mental health risks, and the utility 
of teacher ratings, the question arises of why SBMHS is not widely used. Potential answers 
may be found in the screening debate and unanswered questions regarding the courts’ 
potential treatment of such programs. 
The Screening Debate 
Supporters of SBMHS posit that multiple research studies conducted over several 
decades indicate that children’s mental health is directly connected to various academic and 
life outcomes. In the 1980s and 1990s, a plethora of research explored various aspects of 
children’s mental health, including its association with school dropout rates, teen pregnancy, 
substance abuse, suicide and homicide (Blum, 1987; Lear, Gleicher, St. Germaine, & Porter, 
1991; Puskar, Lamb, & Norton, 1990; Rhodes & Jason, 1988). Additionally, unaddressed 
mental health problems negatively affect the development of emotional and cognitive skills, 
and the effects can lead to school failure, unemployment, and poverty (Campaign for Mental 
Health Reform, 2005; Hirshfield-Becker & Biederman, 2002; McGoey, Eckery, & Dupaul, 
2002; U.S. Public Health Service, 2000). Research has shown that children’s mental and 
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behavioral health is linked to their physical health, academic achievement, and ability to 
adapt successfully throughout life (Masten & Coatsworth, 1998). Mental health screenings 
may aid schools in identifying student psychological needs and connecting students to 
resources available to prevent and ameliorate the negative impact of unmet needs on their 
academic and overall functioning. Failure to provide SBMHS, at the least, makes children 
more vulnerable to these negative outcomes and, consequently, negatively affects the 
public’s welfare. 
Proponents assert that schools’ dual access to children and mental health 
professionals create a unique opportunity to provide resources to students. Apart from the 
family, school is the primary organization to which most children have consistent access over 
a long period of time (Gottfredson, 1981, 1987). Parents and children often face barriers to 
obtaining child-focused mental health services such as lack of health insurance, lack of 
available service providers, and difficulty maneuvering the logistics of health care systems; 
these challenges are especially relevant for children who are members of ethnic minorities 
(U.S. Public Health Service, 2001). By some estimates, students can gain access to mental 
health services more quickly through school-based mental health services than through 
traditional special education services (Flaherty, Weist & Warner, 1996). Children are more 
likely to seek mental health treatment when they have access to school-based services, and 
research indicates that in some elementary schools where students have access to expanded 
mental health services, special education referrals, disciplinary referrals, grade retentions, 
and school climate also improved (Bruns, Walrath, Siegel, & Weist, 2004; Slade, 2002; 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration, 2007). Thus, school-based mental 
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health services increase access for populations in need and such access positively affects 
important school outcomes, including special education service processes. 
Mental health screenings are logically consistent with other health-related services 
schools provide. Students commonly receive vision and hearing screenings at school and are 
screened for the potential presence of learning disabilities and other problems that may 
influence their learning (Yawn et al., 1999). During the course of providing such services, 
schools often obtain personal information about students and the courts have upheld schools’ 
rights to do so (Board of Education v. Earls, 2002; Vernonia v. Acton, 1995). Thus, some 
argue mental health screening is an appropriate activity in light of past school-based health 
services and the types of information collected while providing such services. 
Opponents of mental health screenings in schools hold that such activities are outside 
of school’s traditional role of educator. They argue that, school’s sole purpose is to impart 
academic knowledge and prepare students for professional and vocational pursuits. Some 
argue that legislation such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, with its specific 
emphasis on student performance, creates a mandate for schools to focus on certain aspects 
of learning, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic (Fleischhacker, 2008). Because of 
increased pressure to meet federal educational mandates, school resources of time and effort 
are best spent on academic issues (Fleischhacker). The resultant lesser attention given to 
other areas, such as the arts or physical education, is seen as a necessary sacrifice for the 
stated goal of improved student academic standing. Thus, while knowledge of and 
participation in such activities may supplement student’s general development, such 
endeavors are the responsibility of parents, not schools (Fleischhacker).  
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Even if screening were within the school’s traditional authority, SBMHS creates other 
concerns. First, some physicians and parents have expressed concern that children are over-
diagnosed and receiving inappropriate mental illness diagnoses (Shankar, 2006). This 
concern is based, in part, on the fact that since the early 1990s, the number of children 
diagnosed with serious mental illnesses, such as bipolar disorder, has increased to over 6 
million (Carey, 2006). Some posit that SBHMS will exacerbate the problem of excessive 
children’s mental illness misdiagnoses (Adelmann, 2006; McElroy, 2004). A companion 
argument is that definitions of mental health and illness are debatable and thus accurate 
determinations of psychological functions cannot be had. For example, homosexuality was 
once considered a mental illness requiring treatment, but both the American Psychiatric 
Association (2001) and the American Psychological Association (2009) have adopted the 
position that homosexuality is not an illness or a condition to be repaired. When mental 
illness diagnoses are made, rightly or wrongly, the accompanying stigma can be detrimental 
to the one receiving said label (Surgeon General’s Report on Culture, Race, and Ethnicity, 
1999). Thus SBHMS may result in a series of negative outcomes for students. 
Another argument is that the evidence regarding psychological assessments as a 
whole is conflicted. For example, although standardized tests are widely used and enjoy 
some research support, numerous studies indicate that because of the shortcomings in their 
development, they often provide an inaccurate picture of the factors contributing to student 
outcomes and are inherently biased against poor and ethnic minority students (Helms, 2002; 
Hilliard, 2000; Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson, & Kabin, 2001). Consequently, use of 
inadequately developed measures in SBHMS may result in inaccurate assessments and have 
particularly adverse affects for minority populations. 
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A final argument is that even if such activities are beneficial, they are problematic in 
that they create additional concerns for schools. Specifically, some posit that by offering 
students any type of health screenings, schools obligate themselves to provide additional 
mental health services, such as educational programming and counseling (Allensworth et al., 
1997). These interventions add to administrative costs, such as the hiring and training of 
professionals to maintain the screening program and the costs of purchasing and scoring 
screening instruments. Currently, very little is known about the actual costs of school-based 
mental health programs (Chatterji et al., 2004). Thus, school mental health screening requires 
rigorous economic scrutiny before implementation. 
Screening as a Multidisciplinary Challenge 
Regardless of their views on screening, public schools and those providing mental 
health services within them face the challenge of working within multidisciplinary 
environments. Specifically, schools face unique demands to collaborate with teachers, 
administrators, and various student health providers, including mental health professionals, 
while meeting state and federal service requirements and operating within legal constraints 
(Pennekamp, 1992). The lack of logistical guidance these provide can increase frustration for 
schools seeking to meet student mental health needs within these parameters (Allen-Meres, 
1996). One reason for this difficulty may be the lack of understanding or inappropriate 
application of the courts’ permissions and limitations regarding SBMHS.  
While mental health and school professionals generally receive graduate and 
continuing education training on issues of law relevant to clinical practice and school 
administration, they are unlikely to receive or seek legal training of the type needed to 
understand and predict applications of federal and state law to potential litigation arising 
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from school programming; this set of competencies is likely reserved for school legal counsel 
who may not be consulted until after the school and its employees are made party to 
litigation. Thus, although SBMHS is an interdisciplinary endeavor, the ways schools 
approach implementing these programs may not appropriately consider the potential for 
litigation such program create.  
Summary of Literature Review 
 In summary, disproportionality in special education is a long-standing issue caused by 
multiple and complicated factors (Dunn, 1968; Westat, 2003). Although special education 
placement connects students to potentially beneficial services, it also presents various risks 
for students, including poor academic and life outcomes (National Research Council, 2002). 
Additionally, federal laws require that schools monitor and address disproportionality as a 
condition of federal funding (IDEA). Thus, schools have both academic and financial 
incentives to address this issue. Screening for mental health risk has been proposed as one 
possible intervention (Serna et al., 1998); however, in addition to the possible risks and 
benefits posed by such programs, by virtue of the limited legal training and experience 
school administrators receive, such programming also generates concerns of litigation and 
liability. Consequently, it is important to examine how courts may address legal issues 
arising from screening programs in public schools. The purpose of this review was to explore 
possible legal potentials and impediments to school-based screening as a means of addressing 
disproportionality. 
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CHAPTER 2 
POTENTIALS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO UNIVERSAL, SCHOOL-BASED SCREENING 
FOR BEHAVIORAL AND EMOTIONAL RISK: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE  
ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CASE LAW 
Screening students for emotional and behavioral risk has been posited as a way to 
meet a variety of educational and mental health needs, including disproportional placement 
in special education (Adelman & Taylor, 1999, Campaign for Mental Health Reform, 2005; 
Daly et al., 2006; President’s New Freedom Commission, 2003; Serna, Forness, & Nelson, 
1998; Surgeon General’s Report, 1999; U.S. Public Heath Service, 2000; Weist, Evans, & 
Lever, 2003). Ample psychological research exists regarding certain aspects of screening 
relevant to disproportionality, including student mental health needs and outcomes and the 
advantages and disadvantages of different reporters of student risk (Hoge & Coladarci, 1989; 
U.S. Public Health Service). Additionally, as schools receiving federal funds operate under 
mandates to monitor and address disproportionality, public schools also have financial 
motivations to implement programs to address this long-standing issue (Watioller et al. 
2010). Despite the potential benefits of such programs, a lack of information regarding the 
legal requirements for implementing screening programs, including logistical matters such as 
obtaining informed consent, impedes their wide-scale implementation. This is likely due, in 
part, to the complex nature of such issues as the product of legal theory, ethical 
considerations, and practical application (Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz, & Parker, 2001).  
Screening as Multidisciplinary 
Multidisciplinary endeavors, meaning those that use knowledge or skill from more 
than one academic or clinical area of practice, such as school-based mental health screening 
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(SBMHS) may be conceptualized as using a centrist, pluralistic, or integrationist model. In 
the centrist model, a discipline places itself in a central role and defines other disciplines in 
terms of their differences from similarities to this center and ignores issues outside this center 
of knowledge (van Leeuwen, 2005). This results in structured methods and analysis but 
increases the risk that potentially important issues will go unaddressed (van Leeuwen). The 
pluralist model places issues and problems as central and recognizes that various disciplines, 
which are brought to bear on these issues as unchanged but equal partners, may inform 
potential solutions from different perspectives (van Leeuwen). In comparison, the 
integrationist model, which also sees the problem or issue as central and affected by various 
disciplines, views these disciplines as interdependent and functionally pliable; this approach 
is more flexible but has also been critiqued as a threat to the status quo (van Leeuwen; Weis 
& Wodak, 2003).  
Personnel providing mental health services in schools must negotiate various 
challenges presented by the multidisciplinary nature of their clinical work in an educational 
context. Specifically, licensed mental health professionals use organizationally agreed upon 
ethical standards and codes to determine practice parameters (Bersoff, 2003). Where there 
are questions or disputes regarding these boundaries, mental health professionals are to seek 
consultation or supervision (Bersoff). This process differs from the highly structured, 
adversarial process used to resolve questions of law and policy. Another point of difference 
is that unless and until the U.S. Supreme Court presses federal district and state courts to a 
unitary standard, they may apply their own interpretations of existing statutes and case law. 
This creates a diverse collection of legal restraints that school officials and mental health 
professionals are neither trained to seek out nor understand. Lack of familiarity with the legal 
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boundaries for school-based interventions increases the likelihood of unintentionally 
trespassing upon legal limits. While public schools generally enjoy sovereign immunity, 
ignorance of current law is no protection from liability, and an understanding of how courts 
discuss the provision of mental health services in public schools may help prevent such 
violations. Such awareness may be particularly beneficial in the area of screening, which is 
itself a relatively new intervention. For example, from the documents examined in this 
analysis, there was no indication that either the defendant school or community health center 
sought legal consultation prior to the implementing the screening program at issue or that the 
community task force with which the program was developed included persons with legal 
training. Had legal consultation been obtained prior to the program’s implementation, the 
defendants might have been alerted to and given the opportunity to address potential legal 
violations well in advance of starting the program and avoided the resultant litigation. 
Literature on the possible legal implications of such programs is currently limited to 
case and statutory law addressing the general parent-child-school relationship. To date, only 
one federal district court case, Rhoades v. Penn-Harris, has directly addressed the issue of 
universal screening in public schools and no known social science researcher has 
systematically analyzed this or any other such legal opinion. The purpose of this study was to 
analyze the Rhoades opinions to explore potential challenges to implementing mental health 
screening programs in public school using a critical discourse methodology, specifically, the 
discourse-historical approach (DHA). Within the U.S. educational literature, critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) has successfully been applied to issues of bilingual education 
(May, 2001; Schmidt, 2000); however, no published studies have used CDA to analyze 
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SBMHS programs. Thus, my using CDA to analyze SBMHS issues is a novel application of 
this theory and methodology to an emerging multidisciplinary issue. 
The discourse historical approach emphasizes historical context in investigating 
social issues and encourages the integration of historical sources in both social and political 
fields of study in which the examined events occurred (Wodak, 2001). This approach also 
requires that the context of the discourse analyzed be described as holistically and accurately 
as possible (Titscher et al., 2000). As school and mental health professionals may approach 
student issues differently but both are affected by laws and their contexts, such knowledge is 
essential to address legal concerns and misunderstandings about screening and facilitate 
development of screening programs and policies considerate of legal perspectives. For 
example, historically, courts have given great deference to parental decisions regarding their 
children’s education and often apply heightened levels of scrutiny to laws and activities 
which appear to infringe upon this right, but several Supreme Court decisions regarding 
parental rights leave questions as to these rights may be reviewed based on their legal 
classification as fundamental, substantial or an alternative type of legal right or protection 
(Curran, 2008; Custody of a Minor, 1978). This has implications for SBMHS because the 
types of analysis the court applies to a legal issue are dependent upon the classification of the 
right allegedly affected and directly relate to the potential treatment courts may apply to 
screening program challenges. To provide as complete a context for the Rhoades discourse, I 
provide information regarding parental rights; levels of court case analysis; sovereign 
immunity and school authority; a prior federal court case addressing screening, and 
perspectives on student assent prior to introducing the case study methodology and results. 
Historical Context of Parental Rights 
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Providing school-based services to minor students is complicated by federal and state 
laws and their relationship to the concept of parental rights (Curran, 2008; Fu, 2007). These 
laws have both legal and cultural foundations. Culturally, Mosiac law as set forth in the 
Hebrew tradition provides parents specific and, at times, severe authority over their children 
(Moskowitz, 1975; Witte, 1996). Parental rights were expressly created under English 
common law, which conceptualized children as property, and parental authority as inviolate 
as one’s authority over any another property (Maltz, 2001; Poe v. Gerstein, 1975). As a result 
of such strong moorings, America courts came to hold parental authority in extremity high 
regard, even as sacred, such that the Founding Fathers’ creation of specific constitutional 
protections relevant to the parent-child relationship was likely informed by this zeitgeist 
(Witte, 1996).  
Regarding the legal foundation for parental rights, the U.S. Constitution does not 
create an explicit right for parents to raise their children without governmental influence, but 
this right is implied via the Fourteenth Amendment, also known as the Due Process clause 
guarantee, which states “no state shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law” (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1). In combination, these cultural 
and legal factors generated a now largely accepted perspective that parents have a right to the 
“companionship, care, custody, and management of [their] children” (Gelman, 2005; Stanley 
v. Illinois, 1972). This right includes responsibilities for the child’s education, support, and 
general wellbeing (Custody of a Minor, 1978); however, parents are not expressly provided 
the right to rear children without governmental interference, and the right to privacy, even as 
it applied to parents, is not absolute in that it is shared by the State, which is obligated to act 
in the child’s best interest (Custody of a Minor, 1978; Gelman, 2005; Newmark v. Williams, 
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1991). Specifically, in cases involving children’s medical care where such action was 
deemed to be in the children’s best interest court have intervened over parental objections 
(Dickens, 1998; Newmark v. Williams, 1991). Thus, when discussing SBMHS program-
related questions courts are likely to address and raise questions of parental rights in of these 
programs.  In creating and implementing SBMHS programs, schools should be apprised of 
this important legal history as it has implications for how courts may balance the school’s 
roles and responsibilities with that of the students, parents, and teachers. 
Potential Court Analysis of SBMHS 
Legal analysis involves the application of case facts to federal, state, and local 
statutes, case law, and regulations. Consequently, the resolution of specific SBMHS issues 
will be influenced by the facts of the question presented and the rules and regulations of the 
jurisdiction in which the issues arise. Thus, a review of general legal principles is necessary 
to understand the foundations and constraints upon which laws relevant to SBMHS and 
informed consent are built. 
Generally, courts give great deference to parental decisions regarding their children’s 
education and often apply heightened levels of scrutiny to activities which appear to infringe 
upon this right, but several Supreme Court decisions regarding parental rights raise questions 
as to whether these rights are fundamental, substantial, or merit some other classification 
(Curran, 2008; Custody of a Minor, 1978).This has implications for SBMHS because the 
analysis courts apply will depend upon the classification of the allegedly affected right.  
Despite their not being expressly delineated, the Constitution deems some rights such 
as marriage, procreation, and maintaining custody of one’s children so important as to be 
“fundamental” (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1964; Lawrence v. Texas, 2003; Santosky v. 
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Kramer, 1942; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 2003). When a state action touches upon rights 
considered fundamental, such as those of a parent to rear a child, courts apply a level of 
review known as strict scrutiny (Washington v. Glucksburg, 1997; Zablocki v. Redhail, 
1978). Under this type of review, an action will be held unconstitutional unless the interest it 
is designed to address is a compelling one and the action is narrowly tailored to further the 
stated interest (Lulay v. Lulay, 2000; Roe v. Wade, 1973). This means that if other less 
restrictive means are available to preserve the interest, those must be implemented.  
The question of what constitutes a fundamental right, especially in the context of 
parental rights in education is an evolving one and varies by jurisdiction (Ross, 2000). 
Similar uncertainty exists as to what constitutes a compelling interest and whether certain 
actions are narrow enough to meet the strict scrutiny requirement (Chemerinsky, 2006). 
Assuming strict scrutiny is applied schools must show a compelling interest for SBMHS. At 
least one court has found that AIDS prevention constituted such an interest (Alfonso v. 
Fernandez, 1993). Based on research evidencing relationships between disproportionality 
and various life and academic outcomes, an argument could be made that the consequences 
of a lack of mental health information and resources in schools present a similarly 
compelling state interest. Additionally, schools must also prove that their screening programs 
are narrowly tailored to meet its goals. This requirement may be more challenging in that the 
school must show that its screening program is a narrowly designed, not overly broad, means 
of achieving its permissible goal.  
In comparison to fundamental rights, substantial rights usually merit a less rigorous 
analysis known as rational basis review (Romer v. Evans, 1996). Under this analysis, a law is 
constitutional if it is reasonably related to a legitimate state objective (Adarand Constructors 
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v. Pena, 1995; Herndon v. Chapel-Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Education, 1996). Should courts 
determine that SBMHS touches upon substantial but not fundamental rights, a school’s 
argument that the program was rationally related to a permissible state goal, such as 
providing for the public’s health, may be sufficient. This issue has yet to be decided by 
various state and federal courts, including the Supreme Court. 
Sovereign Immunity and School-Based Mental Health Screening (SBMHS) 
As a rule, government actors including public schools are shielded from civil liability 
when their actions do not “clearly violate established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known” (Rhoades v. Penn-Harris, 2008; Tamayo v. 
Blagojevich, 2008). The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this principle in its 2009 ruling on 
school strip searches (Safford v. Redding). In Rhoades, the case analyzed here, a federal court 
found that although the school violated the Rhoades’ Fourteenth Amendment right to 
privacy, The School could not reasonably have known that their actions were illegal. 
Following Rhoades and Safford although school immunity remains intact informed consent 
practices may be held to a standard that incorporates the litany of concerns discussed in 
Rhoades. These concerns are subsequently presented in more detail, but it should be noted 
that failure to address such issues may remove schools from the immunity afforded them 
when they attempt to comply with established law. 
 
 
Schools’ Authority to Implement SBMHS 
Rhoades in its discussion of parental authority cites the U.S. Supreme Court cases of 
Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Wisconsin v. Yoder. These cases were 
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instrumental in framing the discourse of parental rights in public schools. Their use in 
Rhoades indicates their potential for use in other cases relevant to SBMHS; thus, they are 
briefly explained to inform the context of the Rhoades analysis.  
Adjudicated in 1923, the first Supreme Court case to test parental rights in the context 
of public education, Meyer v. Nebraska, involved a state law that prohibited public and 
private schools from teaching a foreign language to any child who had not passed the eighth 
grade. The Supreme Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional limitation on parental 
rights in part because the Fourteenth Amendment provided the freedom to “establish and 
home and bring up children” without state interference (Meyer v. Nebraska, 1923). Although 
the Court noted a state interest in encouraging cultural assimilation and patriotism, it 
emphasized that this end could not “be promoted by prohibited means” (Meyer v. Nebraska, 
1923). Two years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court addressed an 
Oregon law requiring compulsory enrollment in public schools (1925). The Court held that 
although the State had the authority to regulate schools, including to “inspect, supervise and 
examine them, their teachers and pupils,” the Oregon law “unreasonably interfere[d] with the 
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control” (Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925).  
In tandem, Meyer and Pierce clearly articulated the tensions between parents and 
schools and established the first limits on the influence schools could exert over children’s 
education. In Pierce, the Supreme Court also clearly established a school’s right to test its 
students; however, the question of whether this authority includes psychological testing was 
well as academic evaluations remains to be seen (Id.). Thus, parental rights were effectively 
established as a limit on the state’s educative goals and while states could grant public 
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schools the ability to manage their operations, including the examination of students, the 
school’s authority did not eliminate parents’ right to make decisions about their children’s 
education or upbringing.  
In Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), an Amish couple sought exemption from the State’s 
compulsory education law, arguing that this infringed upon their First Amendment right to 
freedom of religion. The Supreme Court held that “a state’s interest in universal education, 
however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on 
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the 
religious upbringing of their children” (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 1972). The Court acknowledged 
that education was primarily a State function but held that this interest was outweighed by 
the parents’ religious liberty and parental authority. Thus, where a school requirement 
infringes upon parents’ fundamental rights, such as the free exercise of religion, it will likely 
be deemed unconstitutional. As applied to SBMHS, this means that if such a program 
conflicts with a family’s religious beliefs and requires student participation in additional 
activities without sufficient alternatives or options for non-participation, it may be 
unconstitutional.  
Reaching ahead to cases more immediately relevant to SMBHS, in Brown v. Hot, 
Sexy and Safer Products (1995) a federal court upheld the schools’ authority to control its 
curriculum despite parental objection. The court ruled that while parents may have had valid 
objections to the school’s sex education presentation, they could not “restrict the flow of 
information to the public schools” (Id.). The same year in Immediato v. Rye Neck School 
District (1995), non-curricular requirements were addressed. Parents argued that the high 
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school’s community service requirement infringed upon their rights to exclude their child 
from undesirable activities and, as the requirement was not related to the school’s 
curriculum, was unconstitutional (Id.). The court held that the service requirement’s goal was 
to impart a sense of civic duty and was thus sufficiently related to the school’s curriculum as 
to be within the school’s authority (Id.). In light of these cases, it seems schools possess wide 
latitude in the activities they may provide and require. Some legal scholars posit that the 
Brown and Immediato rulings make it impossible for parents to challenge school 
requirements that are even remotely related to academic goals (Gelman, 2005). Because of 
this perceived authority, it may be argued that if screening, particularly school or class-wide 
screening, is related to some academic purpose and does not infringe upon parents’ 
constitutional rights, it is permissible; however, several factors complicate this analysis. 
First, the relatively recent Supreme Court case of Troxel v. Granville (2000) may 
provide some insight into how the Court may address these issues. At issue in Troxel was a 
state statute permitting any person at any time to petition the court for child visitation when it 
was in the child’s best interest (2000). The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny and held 
that the law was unconstitutional, in part, because it failed to consider the parent’s perception 
of the child’s best interest and was “breathtakingly broad” (Id.). Some have interpreted the 
court’s application of strict scrutiny and the language of the majority decision in Troxel to 
suggest that parental authority may be strengthened in the context of public education, but 
others see Troxel an indication that the Supreme Court may clearly delineate parental 
authority as a fundamental right or limit school’s authority over its students (Bloom, 2003; 
Curran, 2008; Fu, 2007; Gelman, 2005); however, several post-Troxel school-related cases 
have applied rational basis review to parents’ attempts to exempt their students from school 
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requirements such as school uniform policy and sex education class (Leebaert v. Harrington, 
2003; Vines v. Board of Education, 2002). Also of interest to SBMHS, in the post-Troxel 
case of Doe v. Heck (2003) after county social service workers interviewed students about 
corporal punishment without prior parental consent, parents claimed that this violated their 
right to “familial relations.” The court did not expressly rule on the parental rights issue but 
acknowledged that in light of Troxel the appropriate level of scrutiny was unclear (Doe v. 
Heck, 2003). Thus, the question of the level of scrutiny courts will consistently apply to any 
level of screening remains unanswered. 
In addition to case law, informed consent for SBMHS is also subject to legislation. In 
2003, the Illinois state legislature enacted the Children’s Mental Health Act (CMHA), which 
requires, inter alia, psychological health assessments for children in Illinois public schools 
(Children’s Mental Health Act, 2003). In comparison, several states have introduced or 
passed laws limiting individual-level screening. For example, in 2006 and 2007, respectively, 
Alaska and Utah enacted bills prohibiting schools and teachers from recommending 
psychological assessment or intervention for students (S.B. 48, 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ak. 
2005); H.B. 202, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ut. 2007). Taking the middle road, a 2004 Indiana 
statute provides that “a student shall not be required to participate in a personal analysis, an 
evaluation, or a survey that is not directly related to academic instruction and that reveals or 
attempts to affect the student’s attitudes, habits, traits, opinions, beliefs, or feelings” (§ 20-
10.1-4-15(b)). Thus, states differ in whether and how they will allow individual- or group-
level screenings.  
Merriken and School-Based Mental Health Screening 
48 
 
Merriken v. Cressman is a 1973 federal district court case cited in Rhoades discussion 
of school counseling and testing and parental rights. Merriken directly addresses issues of 
psychological testing in schools but Rhoades does not provide contextual information about 
the case. As such information may facilitate an understanding of Rhoades’ use of Merriken 
and inform recommendations for screening program development, it is provided here.  
In the early 1970s, a Pennsylvania high school implemented a drug prevention 
program called Critical Period of Intervention (Merriken v. Cressman, 1973). The program 
required students and teachers to complete questionnaires soliciting information regarding 
student demographics, individual behavior, and home life (Id.). Initially, the school attempted 
to secure student participation by using a passive consent procedure in which “silence would 
be construed as acquiescence,” but after the suit was filed, the school changed the procedure 
to “affirmative written parental consent” (Id.). Student Merriken’s parents argued that 
because the instrument the school selected sought highly sensitive information about the 
student’s family and relationships, they should have been explicitly informed of the school’s 
intent to administer the test (Id.). The court agreed and held that although there was scientific 
evidence that depression and suicide were significant health problems, because of the highly 
sensitive nature of the information sought and the constitutionally protected rights of parents 
to control the rearing of their children and ergo the information obtained from them, the 
school’s implied consent procedure was insufficient to protect parents’ rights (Id.). 
Merriken raised several additional issues relevant to potential legal analyses of 
SBMHS. First, while the Merriken court acknowledged the need to understand and prevent 
drug abuse and the potential benefits of such a program, they stated that, as designed, the CPI 
program created “too much of a chance that the wrong people for the wrong reasons will be 
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singled out and counseled in the wrong manner” (1973). The court also opined that “the 
actual testing of the students and the results gained are suspect” and that the research used by 
the defendants did not define the term potential drug user or clearly state a connection 
between its analysis and the intended results of the program (Id.). Additionally, the court 
expressed discomfort with the lack of information provided regarding how many children 
could be falsely identified (Id.).  
The Merriken court also took issue with “the qualifications for the personnel who 
[would] administer the so-called interventions” (1973). The court relied upon the testimony 
of psychiatrists that psychological instruments were “quite sophisticated and require the 
skills of trained psychotherapists, psychiatrists, psychologists, etc. who have undergone 
many years of training” (Id.). Supporting this point the court referenced a 1971 article, 
“Some Legal and Psychological Concerns about Personality Testing in the Public Schools:” 
which stated: 
…in all probability, [parents are] not clear regarding the qualifications of 
the school ‘psychologist’ who is likely to hold a master’s degree in school 
psychology, not from the psychology department of a college or 
university, but from an education school or department. Chances are great 
that he has not had significant supervision in a hospital, or outpatient 
clinic, or from a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. He is likely to be 
considered ‘untrained’ by the persons the parents have in mind when they 
‘picture’ a psychologist (pp. 114-115). 
 
Generally speaking, the court was concerned that the personnel responsible for carrying out 
the clinical aspects of the program were not qualified to do so. 
Lastly, the Merriken court noted that student confidentiality throughout the program 
was of major concern. Specifically, the court was concerned that students’ information would 
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not remain confidential during the administration of the test, that confidentiality may be 
violated by reporting results to various individuals and entities including law enforcement 
(1973). Because of these issues were not addressed in the school’s informed consent 
agreement, the court held that the school’s consent procedure was inadequate and, 
consequently, invalid (Id.). 
Student Assent 
Currently, children are generally believed to lack the psychological ability to engage 
in the decision-making processes required to meet the Nuremburg Code’s standard of 
voluntary participation (The Code). It is unclear when minors obtain the capacity to assent to 
participation in various activities including psychological evaluation or research. In Cardwell 
v. Bechtol (1973), a medical treatment case, the Tennessee Supreme Court generated the Rule 
of Sevens, which stated that there exists a rebuttable presumption that children between the 
ages of seven and fourteen lack the mental capacity to consent to medical treatment. 
Conversely, for children age 14 and older, the rebuttable presumption is that they have the 
capacity to consent (Cardwell v. Bechtol, 1973). A child’s assent to participation is required 
for research purposes (Berg et al., 2001); however, unless they have been granted legal 
emancipation, children lack the legal capacity to consent to participate in such activities 
(Thiel, 2002). Thus, obtaining minor students’ assent for participation in SBMHS has a basis 
in previous and current legal and ethical standards. 
 
 
Rhoades Case History 
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The discourse-historical approach also requires that case setting be described as 
accurately as possible (Titscher et al., 2000). The PACER documentation states that the 
Complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana on 
September 16, 2005. Two opinions, both written by Judge J. T. Moody (hereinafter, The 
Court), were entered in the case. The 2006 opinion was entered, that is filed with the clerk of 
the court, on September 26, 2006. The 2008 opinion was entered on August 5, 2008. The 
undisputed facts (those presented in the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ pleadings and the court’s 
opinions) are as follows: In October 2004, several Penn High School administrators prepared 
and signed correspondence which was disseminated to high school student parents. This 
correspondence stated that students would participate in an administration of TeenScreen, 
termed a mental health evaluation, unless parents “opted out” by returning an attached form 
indicating they did not want their children to participate. In December 2004, Chelsea 
Rhoades, a 15-year-old tenth grader, participated in a school-wide screening program that 
used the TeenScreen suicide risk assessment. After completing the evaluation, Chelsea was 
told by an individual affiliated with the screening program that based on her responses she 
had obsessive compulsive disorder and a social anxiety disorder. Chelsea informed her 
mother of these events, and her parents brought suit against Penn-Harris-Madison School 
Corporation, an legal organization including the student’s high school (hereinafter, “The 
School”) as an organization, school employees as individuals and in their official capacity 
with the School, and Madison Center, Inc. (hereinafter, “The Center”), a “community mental 
health center” that administered the TeenScreen to the Penn High School students. 
The 2006 opinion arose from the Center’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint, the complaint filed after the original complaint, for lack of subject matter 
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jurisdiction. In this instance, such lack of jurisdiction would mean that the plaintiffs’ claims 
were administrative, not federal, and consequently, federal court was not the proper arena to 
resolve the claims. The Court dismissed two counts of the complaint as to the Center only, 
meaning all counts pertaining to the School were unaffected. 
The 2008 opinion arose from The School’s motion for summary judgment. If granted, 
this motion would mean The Court concluded that, for certain counts, no legal issue existed 
for adjudication. This conclusion would prevent those counts from progressing to trial.  
In the 2006 opinion, the legal question presented in the motion to dismiss required 
The Court to review the plaintiffs’ claims and determine which, if any, were appropriate for 
federal adjudication. This type of legal conclusion answers the question, “Is this court the 
proper place to answer these legal questions?” As such, a detailed examination of the facts 
may be less relevant, and, as was the factual discussion in the 2006 opinion, the resulting 
opinion may be relatively brief. As the Court states in the 2008 court opinion, as established 
by the federal rules of civil procedure and federal case law, the legal standard for granting a 
motion for summary judgment is that the evidence shows there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact (Rhoades, 2008, p. 890). A motion for summary judgment requires resolution of 
factual issues. Consequently, these opinions can be relatively lengthy and detailed because 
The Court must support its conclusions on all of the legal issues pertaining to the motion by 
applying the facts deemed relevant to those issues. Thus, that the 2008 opinion contains more 
facts than the 2006 opinion is not unusual considering the different legal questions presented 
and the standards required for their resolution. Despite this difference in context, because the 
opinions arose from the same discourse, I examined the texts’ linguistic implementations 
with the expectation that they would provide similar data for analysis. 
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Research Questions 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the case of Rhoades v. Penn-Harris using 
the discourse-historical approach to explore how a court has discussed and decided issues 
arising out of a school-based mental health screening (SBMHS) program. Through this study, 
I sought to answer the following research questions: 
1. How are entities involved in the program referenced? 
2. How are relative power relationships organized? 
3. What argumentation strategies are used in the screening program discourse? 
4. Which knowledge bases are used within the Rhoades opinions?  
Methods 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to use contemporary case law to 
explore how one court addressed legal issues generated by screening programs in public 
schools. Qualitative research allows context-specific, in-depth, detailed exploration of 
phenomena; thus, it is often used to investigate novel or not yet well-defined phenomena 
(Creswell, 2007). Because of its emphasis on in-depth analysis as opposed to generalizability 
of results, qualitative research can be appropriately applied to small data sets, including 
single case studies, and historical and contemporary documents obtained from various 
sources (Merriam, 2009). Also, in qualitative research, the categories, that is, the patterns or 
findings used to answer research questions may be determined from previous research 
(Merriam). For this study, the research questions and consequently the data categories were 
taken from the listing of structuring questions and concepts used in Wodak’s (2001) previous 
applications of the discourse-historical approach (DHA) to legal and political discourse.  
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Power relationships are central to any critical discourse-related analysis (Wodak & 
Meyer, 2009). For the purpose of this study, positions of relative power are also important as 
they may indicate how the court arrived at its conclusions of entity and individual liability for 
those involved in the screening program at issue. Power is relative in that it requires at least 
two unequal positions of authority or action (Wodak & Meyer). One way of noting existence 
of this relativity is through reference or nomination. In this linguistic strategy, in- and out-
groups are constructed by the creation of membership categories (Wodak, 2001). 
Reference/nomination can also indicate bias held for or against particular groups (Wodak). 
Thus, in this investigation, in addition to suggesting power relationships, 
reference/nomination may also reflect bias the court possessed regarding particular entities or 
individuals involved in or affected by the screening program. Based on her previous legal 
and policy research, Wodak developed a list of 15 topoi, or argumentation strategies, 
frequently used in such discourse to support arguments for or against particular conclusions 
to proposed social problems. This set of topoi was considered appropriate because I sought to 
obtain information to address a social issue, screening as a potential intervention for 
disproportionality. Lastly, as DHA is designed to be an interdisciplinary research method, it 
aims to developing relations between disciplines that enhance their capacities, individually 
and collectively, to address the dialectical nature of the relations between various areas and 
aspects of social life (Fairclough, 2005). As SBMHS has health and legal implications that 
are and will continue to affect the implementation of such programs, an understanding of 
how a court may view such interdisciplinarity may provide a starting point for future 
collaboration between the fields. Based on these parameters and goals, a qualitative case 
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study using a discourse-historical approach was the most appropriate methodology for this 
exploratory investigation. 
The discourse-historical approach is a multitheoretical, multimethodological approach 
that emphasizes historical context in investigating social issues and encourages the 
integration of historical sources in both social and political fields of study (Wodak, 2001). As 
DHA incorporates historical and other contextual information in its data analysis, it allows 
for a comprehensive presentation that facilitates an understanding of current perspectives 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 2001, 2006). Thus, this approach is appropriate for the 
analysis of legal texts, which often use historical and context-specific information to assist 
the reader in understanding the court’s logic and conclusions. 
DHA is a form of critical discourse analysis, which has its foundations in critical-
dialectical and phenomenological-hermeneutic approaches to theory. From the critical-
dialectical approach, CDA obtains its focus on the criticism of discourses, particularly 
examining them for contradictions and considering them in social and historical contexts 
(Weis & Wodak, 2003). Because particular ways discourse uses language and presents power 
relationships are often unclear to the readers of the discourse, a goal of CDA is to make these 
opaque discourse aspects more transparent (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). From the 
phenomenological-hermeneutic approach, CDA assumes that all scientific theory, including 
social science theory, originates in a social matrix that is vital for understanding how 
knowledge works in everyday life (Schutz, 1962; Weis & Wodak). Specifically, in this social 
matrix, discourse creates the social identities of and relationships between people and entities 
and delineates the knowledge available and applied to individual and groups; discourse also 
facilitates existence of the social status quo by contributing to its maintenance or 
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modification (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Case law exemplifies this connection of 
discourse to social life in that it delineates the permissions and limitations of power and 
relationship among persons and groups in statutes and case opinions. These boundaries are 
continually referenced, clarified, maintained, or modified by subsequent case law. This view 
of scientific inquiry not readily transparent but social in origin and effect is foundational not 
only to CDA but to various qualitative methods including grounded theory (Weis & Wodak, 
2003). These commonalities provide additional support for the combination of DHA with 
established qualitative methods in a case study of legal opinion. 
Role of the researcher 
 Researcher interest, motivation, and worldviews can influence how data are collected 
and interpreted (Creswell, 2007). Perhaps particularly in policy-related texts, readers do not 
approach the text passively but with values, purposes, experiences, and histories that 
influence the meaning derived from the text (Creswell). Critical discourse analysis assumes 
that the analyst’s personal history and social experience are not left behind when reading 
texts; rather, they should be clearly presented for the reading audience (Meyer, 2001). Thus, 
as the researcher I inform the reader that I have worked in educational, legal, and 
psychological settings in the roles of public school substitute teacher, licensed attorney, 
screening research team member, and psychology intern in a state hospital-affiliated 
program. These experiences facilitated an understanding of legal, psychological, and less so 
educational issues investigated in this study. Additionally, I am interested in the empirical 
study and clinical application of issues relevant to children’s mental health needs and health 
disparities. Specifically, based on my interactions with historically advantaged groups in 
clinical and forensic settings, I believe lack of access to mental health treatment, including 
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preventative interventions, significantly contributes to a variety of negative life outcomes and 
that student screening for mental health prevention and intervention should be considered as 
one method of addressing mental health resources disparities. I am also of the belief that 
healthcare and psychological practice operate within a legal system whose goals and 
limitations differ significantly from those of others fields. As a result, litigation outcomes 
may be more likely to reflect legal as opposed to health or psychological considerations. In 
combination, these experiences and beliefs resulted in my interpretations being somewhat 
legally conservative; specifically, I highlighted the cautions involved in developing SBMHS 
programs with the intention of providing guidance in creating legally permissible forms of 
such programs. Also, my legal training and experience resulted in explanations written in 
language that is more legal, as compared to psychological or educational in terminology and 
tone. This reflected my challenges in writing critically about a system in which I have been 
educated and practiced.  
Data collection 
In documentary research, the documents to be analyzed may be appraised in terms of 
authenticity, reliability, meaning, and theory (McCulloch, 2004). Authenticity requires a 
determination of the genuineness and origin of the document, which can be obtained from the 
document’s place and date of creation (Merriam, 2009; Scott, 1990). Document reliability 
may refer to whether the documents provide an accurate account of the events presented 
therein (Tosh, 2002). The court opinions analyzed in this study were obtained from 
LexisNexus Academic, an online database of various legal documents, including federal 
district court opinions. Other case-related documents were obtained from the Public Access 
to Court Electronic Records (PACER), an online public access service provided by the 
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federal judiciary that archives and provides electronic user access to case and docket 
information, including pleadings and documentary evidence, from federal appellate, district 
and bankruptcy courts. As the documents provided in these databases must accurately reflect 
their authorship, origin, dates of publication, and contents as provided by their authors and 
those submitting documents to the database, I deemed them to meet the requirements for 
authenticity and reliability. 
Case studies require use of a criterion data sample procedure, meaning documents 
should be selected only if they meet particular and predetermined qualifications (Creswell, 
2007; Merriam, 2009). For this case study, the qualifications for inclusion were state and 
federal civil court opinions, published within the past 20 years, specifically addressing 
universal mental health screening in public schools. From prior work, I was aware of one 
such case, Rhoades v. Penn-Harris, a federal district court case. Copies of the two Rhoades v. 
Penn-Harris court opinions were obtained from the LexisNexus Academic database. Using 
the LexisNexus Academic database, I conducted a search for state and federal cases citing 
Rhoades where universal mental health screening in public schools was the issue presented 
for discussion. Terms used for the search included student and/or child, public school or 
schools, psychological testing, assessment, evaluation or screening, mental health testing, 
assessment, evaluation, or screening. These words and terms were also used to search 
LexisNexus Academic for state and federal case law involving universal mental health 
screening not citing Rhoades. Neither of these searches yielded any additional school 
screening case opinions. To obtain additional information regarding the context of the 
Rhoades case, the following case documents and their attached documentary evidence were 
obtained from PACER: Complaint, Answer, Defendants’ Brief in Support of Its Motion for 
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Summary Judgment, and the Plaintiff’s Brief in Response to Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Regarding the meaning of documents, data obtained from documents should be clear 
and comprehensible; this may require explaining technical phrases, institution- or individual-
specific allusions or references, and an awareness of changes in the uses of terms and words 
(McCulloch, 2004). As I, the researcher, have didactic and experiential training in both law 
and psychology, I was aware of particular practice-area-specific jargon and how use of 
terminology in one area may differ in definition and/or application in another areas. In 
critical discourse analysis, the goal is not to determine the conclusive or correct meaning of a 
text but to consider various meanings as indicative of examined texts’ ambiguities, 
contradictions, distortions, and absences (Codd, 1998; McCulloch). In this study, the goal of 
explaining legal and psychological terminology was not to obtain a single, all-inclusive 
meaning of the examined discourse but to provide possible meanings and additional context 
for the data analysis and interpretation. Thus, in qualitative research, theorizing allows for the 
explanation of an area of practice and the prediction of future activity (Merriam, 2009). This 
is consistent with the study’s exploratory purpose and use of Wodak’s (2001) data categories. 
In this study, CDA as applied through DHA provided the theoretical basis for analysis and 
interpretation. 
Data Analysis 
The discourse-historical approach has been used with a three-dimensional analysis, 
specifically, forms of linguistic implementation, contents, and argumentation strategies 
(Matouschek et al., 1995). Forms of linguistic implementation include texts, sentences, and 
words. Argumentation strategies are unconscious or conscious processes, or plans of action, 
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operating at varying levels of communication. While linguistic implementation and 
argumentation strategies may be generally found in and transferable to other texts, because of 
the uniqueness of their linguistic presentations, the content of a text is viewed as specific and 
nontransferable; this is consistent with the limitations of transferability in qualitative research 
(Merriam, 2009).  
Methods used to apply DHA may be modified to accommodate brief discourse 
investigations (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Case law options often contain information on 
diverse, as opposed to single, legal issues; for example, multiple topics and their legal 
analyses may be presented and opinion may contain statements on particular legal 
procedures. For this reason, the three-dimensional analysis requirement that text be described 
as accurately as possible at all linguistic levels was modified such that linguistic 
implementation was applied only to portions of the opinion discourse related to the Rhoades 
screening program. The researcher retained Titscher et al.’s (2000) requirement that case 
setting and context be described as accurately as possible. Additionally, as CDA should 
account for what is present as well as absent in discourse, such differences were noted in my 
analysis (Kress & van Leewen, 2001). For example, in the psychological literature, 
individual and public health implications of student mental health issues are often cited as 
support for SBMHS. Thus, analysis of the data also consisted of reviewing the presence or 
absence of similar health-related implications.  
The Rhoades 2006 and 2008 federal district court opinions written by Judge J. T. 
Moody were used for data analysis. I analyzed each opinion at three levels: as a whole or 
complete document, as individual but connected paragraphs, and as individual but connected 
sentences. Specifically, these whole, paragraph, and sentence units were analyzed for 
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statements regarding the defendant school’s screening program and, as the program was 
developed in response to student suicide, student mental health issues generally. The research 
questions were addressed by analyzing relevant texts for the following categories of interests: 
(a) use of referential or nomination strategies using titles/names, characteristics, qualities, or 
other descriptions attributed to entities involved in SBHMS; (b) relative power relationships; 
(c) use of argumentation strategies with an emphasis on the topoi, that is, explicit or inferable 
premises that connect an argument to, or justify an argument’s transition to, its conclusion or 
claim, as developed by Wodak (2001) in her prior analysis of social issues addressed in 
public policy; and, d) the interdisciplinary perspective (e.g., centrist, pluralist, or 
integrationist) used.  
Trustworthiness 
In qualitative research, trustworthiness refers to the accuracy of the interpretations 
made from the data (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For qualitative data to be trustworthy, that is 
plausible enough to persuade the reading audience that the data are worthy of one’s attention 
and that the results are worthy of confidence, it must be obtained through efforts that are 
credible and dependable (Lincoln & Guba). Credibility means that the study’s findings and 
any interpretations based on those findings are derived using an appropriate research design 
and data analysis methods (Lincoln & Guba). Data triangulation for data analysis is one 
method that may be used to meet the credibility threshold (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Lincoln 
& Guba). Dependability requires that the research findings be determined by the data such 
that interpretations are independent of the researchers’ perspectives, motives, or interests 
(Lincoln & Guba). Creswell (2007) suggests researchers may limit the effect of these 
personal factors on data interpretation by “bracketing” such bias during the analysis. In 
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comparison, CDA assumes strict objectivity cannot be achieved; the risk of biased 
interpretation may be reduced by making research choices transparent and using theory to 
justify why some interpretations seem more valid than others (Meyer, 2001; Wodak, 2001). 
In this study triangulation of data perspectives (Creswell, 2007; Scollon, 2003) and peer 
review (Merriam, 2009) were used to reduce bias in data interpretation and increase 
trustworthiness. Specifically, drafts of completed analyses were submitted to a committee 
member with qualitative research expertise and experience in several such studies. 
In this study, I used Wodak’s (2001) triangulatory approach, which is based on the concept 
of context and takes into account four levels of comparison and contrast related to the 
research questions. First, the internal language of the 2006 and 2008 texts was analyzed for 
the presence, absence, and interpretation of concepts established by the research questions. 
Next an intertextual analysis was used to compare statements relevant to the research 
questions between the 2006 and 2008 opinions. For triangulation of Rhoades case context, 
the presentation of facts in the aforementioned PACER-obtained case documents were 
compared to each other and to the facts presented in the 2006 and 2008 opinions. Data were 
also triangulated to the case’s sociopolitical and historical contexts. Specifically, because the 
Rhoades opinions were preceded by and cited the federal school-related cases of Fields v. 
Palmdale (2005) and C.N. v. Ridgewood (2005), these cases were also reviewed for research 
question delineated concepts. The Supreme Court cases of Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, and Wisconsin v. Yoder were also reviewed and their discourse relevant to 
the research questions compared to that in the Rhoades case.  
 
Results 
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Reference/Nomination of Screening Program Actors 
 In the linguistic strategy of reference/nomination, in- and out-groups are constructed 
by the creation of membership categories (Wodak, 2001). Such groups may be directly 
created through the application of covert labels or more subtly as through analogy or 
metaphor. In legal opinions, labels such as “plaintiff” and “defendant” are customary; 
however, even such familiar labels assist in framing the discourse. Specifically, discussing 
those involved in litigation in terms of their respective roles or titles instead of as individuals 
may work to depersonalize the events underlying the litigation and the potential 
consequences of the legal decision.  As the purpose of this study was to explore court 
discourse relevant to the broad issue of student mental health screening program 
implementation, this analysis did not focus on the use of these specific customary terms but 
on other ways distinct groupings of and separations between entities and concepts were 
created within the Rhoades decision; however, in keeping with the reflexive nature of critical 
discourse analysis, I acknowledge that using similar labels in this analysis may have certain 
discursive effects. For example, I chose to identify the judge writing the opinions as “The 
Court,” not by name or some other label. Discussing those involved in litigation in terms of 
their respective roles or titles instead of as individuals may work to depersonalize the events 
underlying the litigation and the potential consequences of the legal decision. Such terms 
may also reinforce or suggest approval of these roles, limit perceptions and discussion of the 
entities involved. Here the use of these terms is to maintain continuity with terms used in the 
case opinions to facilitate comprehension of the concepts explored in this study 
An example of reference/nomination is provided by the identical headings of the 
Rhoades opinions:  
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TERESA RHOADES and MICHAEL ALLEN RHOADES, 
individually and as parents and next friends of CHELSEA 
RHOADES, a minor, Plaintiffs, v. PENN-HARRIS-
MADISON SCHOOL CORPORATION, an Indiana Political 
Subdivision, et al., Defendants. 
 
In addition to informing the reader of the members included in the categories of plaintiff and 
defendant, the use of “et al.,” indicates that the defendant category includes yet unidentified 
members. The following defendants are omitted from the header but introduced in the text:  
Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation, an Indiana political subdivision, 
David R Tydgat, individually and in his official capacity as Principal of Penn 
High School, a division of Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation, Dave 
Risner, individually and in his official capacity as Associate Principal of Penn 
High School, Steven Hope, individually and in his official capacity as 
Assistant Principal of Penn High School, Vickie Marshall, individually and in 
her official capacity as Guidance Counselor at Penn High School, Marni 
Cronk, individually and in her official capacity as Guidance Counselor of 
Penn High [and] Madison Center Inc, an Indiana non profit 
corporation…(Rhoades, 2006, 2008). 
 
This suggests that the Court will discuss the School as an entity and its various employees, 
and the Center only as an organization. Although not noted in the header or the introductory 
text, the Court also discusses the involvement of two individuals for whom their 
organizational affiliation is unclear. In both opinions, reference/nomination creates groups 
from the persons and entities referenced in and omitted from the opinion headers.  
In each opinion the child/student and her parents are consistently grouped as a 
category separate from other entities. The descriptions used for this categorization include 
those traditionally used in cases involving minors and parents. For example, the 2006 and 
2008 opinion headers and introductions, respectively, label the parents as the “next best 
friends of their daughter” and as “Chelsea's parents and next friends” (Rhoades, 2006, p. 3; 
2008, pp. 890, 896).  
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Statements regarding the parents’ interest in their child’s upbringing and describing 
the parental relationship as private emphasize the closed nature of the parent-child group 
(Rhoades, 2006, pp. 17-18; 2008, p. 889). The Court notes that this private interest in rearing 
children is consistent with the historical and legal perspective of parent-child relationships 
(Rhoades, 2008, p. 894). Thus, The Court maintains a long-standing legal conceptualization 
of parents and children as a unit and creates a presumption that The Court will treat other 
entities as distinctly separate from this group.  
Regarding The School, The Court’s discussion grouped it with The Center and a 
community task force by noting the (in)actions engaged in regarding the screening program. 
The task force was described as consisting of “leaders in the community in the business, 
education and health fields,” which presents the task force lacking input from parents, the 
group alleging a violation of rights (Rhoades, 2008, p. 891). Within the School-task force 
discourse, The Court noted that the community task force asked The School to implement a 
suicide prevention program, to allow the Center to conduct the screening program, and to use 
a passive parental consent form for the program (Rhoades, 2008, p. 891); however, the task 
force is not listed in the suit, nor does the opinion suggest that it should be. This results in 
The School being grouped with the task force in terms of screening program activity but not 
legal liability.  
Regarding The School’s affiliation with The Center, although the 2006 opinion stated 
that The Center “accepted a lead role in the development of” the screening program, prior to 
the 2008 opinion The School attempted to separate itself from The Center by describing it as 
an “entity which is unconnected to PHMSC” (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 905-906). Specifically, The 
School argued that there was “no evidence that [it] had any control (or knowledge)” of 
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certain of The Center’s activities, specifically, how assent was obtained from some students, 
The Center’s representative’s discussion with Chelsea, or the results of Chelsea’s 
TeenScreen, and should not be held liable for these actions (Rhoades, 2008, p. 907); 
however, The Court’s discourse consistently groups the two organizations. For example, the 
screening program is described as being “conducted by defendant Madison Center…acting as 
the agent of defendant Penn-Harris-Madison School Corporation” (Rhoades, 2006, p. 3). The 
School is also noted as inviting The Center to The School to conduct the screening, seeking 
assistance from The Center in administering the screening program generally and in specific 
program logistics such as the selection of a passive parental consent procedure after an active 
consent procedure yielded a low response rate, providing school space and other resources to 
conduct the screening, and using Center Employees to supervise and administer the 
TeenScreen to students  (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 890-891, 906-907). The Court maintained and 
expanded its 2006 holding, stating that even if the School-Center relationship was not one of 
agency, such that The Center was an independent contractor with The School, The School 
may still be liable for damages (Rhoades, 2008, p. 909). Thus, because of the screening 
program activities shared by The School and The Center, uncertainly about the legal nature 
of the School-Center affiliation was insufficient to remove The School from potential 
liability arising from The Center’s (in)actions. 
As with The School and Center, the opinions discussed individual school employees 
in terms of their activities related to the screening program. For example, the opinions noted 
teachers as being informed of the program and its schedule and releasing students to 
participate, but they were not named in the complaint nor did the opinions discuss their 
omission as an oversight (Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). In comparison, the associate principal and 
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guidance counselors, who were named as parties to the action, were noted as preparing the 
test schedule, preparing correspondence for teachers about the screening program, and 
requiring that students sign an assent form prior to participating in the program (Rhoades, 
2008, pp. 891-892). The Court determined that, as required for summary judgment, the facts 
viewed most favorably for the plaintiffs indicated that the screening program violated the 
Rhoadeses’ federal right to privacy but, as questions existed as to whether the individual 
employees knew their actions were wrong, the individual employees retained their qualified 
immunity and were granted a summary judgment on the federal claims (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 
899, 911). Consequently, because they could not reasonably have known their actions 
violated federal rights, the individual school employee defendants were not held liable. This 
raises questions of what facts may indicate that The School employees knew or should have 
known that their actions violated parental rights and, as a result, generate a different 
conclusion regarding The School’s qualified immunity and liability. 
The Court discussed two other individuals’ involvement in the screening program but 
did not clearly group them with either The School or The Center. According to Chelsea, the 
first individual participated in obtaining student assent by reading something about the 
TeenScreen prior to its administration, telling her that she needed to sign the assent form, and 
telling students to proceed quickly because others needed to complete the screening 
(Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). This individual is also noted by her inaction, particularly, not telling 
Chelsea the screening was voluntary and that she could refuse to participate (Rhoades, 2008, 
p. 892). The Court also discussed an individual identified as “a representative of Madison 
Center [who] informed Chelsea that she suffered from two mental health problems: 
obsessive-compulsive disorder and social anxiety disorder” (Rhoades, 2006, p. 3). In the 
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2008 opinion, The Center representative is identified as a woman who told Chelsea that she 
had the two mental health problems and she could talk to a counselor or have her mother call 
The Center for treatment (Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). Although it is unclear with which entity 
these persons were affiliated, considering The Court’s determinations regarding The Center’s 
and The School’s liability, employees of either organization could have been held liable for 
their participation in the screening program.  
In addition to The Center and the task force, The School and its actions were also 
grouped by analogy to an entity not a party to the action. In the 2008 opinion, The Court 
compared The School’s argument that it was not responsible for The Center’s 
communication of psychological information to Chelsea to The School’s having invited the 
North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) for an information session, a 
student’s being molested, then The School’s arguing it was not responsible for the student’s 
damages because The School itself did not inflict the injury (Rhoades, 2008, p. 906). The 
Court stated that this comparison is not intended to be facetious as an analogy. The School’s 
disclaimer to the NAMBLA example groups The School’s actions with an act resulting in 
physical and emotional harm to a child and groups The School as an organization with 
another entity whose actions are harmful to children. 
In the 2008 opinion, groups are also created using abstract concepts, such as the law; 
specifically, the entities and issues in Rhoades are compared to prior case law addressing 
similar questions arising from school activities. In discussing the cases of C.N. v. Ridgewood 
Board of Education (2005) and Fields v. Palmdale School District (2005), each cases in 
which the court found in favor of the school on the grounds that the survey activities at issue 
fell within the schools’ authority, The Court stated that its case should not be grouped with 
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C.N. or Fields, in part because the survey administered in Rhoades was not anonymous as in 
these cases (Rhoades, 2008, p. 898). Additionally, the surveys in C.N. and Fields were 
designed to collect aggregate data while TeenScreen was to determine if an individual 
student “was a suicide risk or had other significant psychological problems” (Rhoades, pp. 
898-899). Thus, The Court viewed The School’s screening program as belonging to a 
category separate from the programs at issue in C.N. and Fields because the screening 
program differed in purpose, type of risk identified (i.e., individual or community), and the 
type of information collected from students (i.e., identifiable individual or aggregate 
anonymous). 
The Court’s discourse also grouped the legal issues presented into potential state and 
federal liabilities. Specifically, The Court used C.N. and Fields to support its conclusion that 
the federal issues raised by the plaintiffs of the “liberty interest in upbringing of children” 
and their “privacy interest in non-disclosure of personal information” contained sufficient 
questions of facts to deny The School’s motion for summary judgment on those issues 
(Rhoades, 2008, p. 899, 904). Regarding state law issues, the plaintiffs alleged the screening 
program violated a statute preventing mandatory student participation in “a survey revealing 
personal beliefs and opinions” (Rhoades, 2008, p. 904). The Court granted The School 
summary judgment on this issue because it was unclear whether the state law provided the 
type of remedy the plaintiffs sought; however, The Court expressed concern that student 
participation in the screening program may not have been voluntary (Rhoades, 2008, p. 904, 
905). Specifically, The Court questioned whether the conditions under which the students, 
particularly Chelsea, signed the assent form rendered the process involuntary (Rhoades, 
2008, pp. 891-892).  
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Power 
The Rhoades case header suggests relative power relationships even prior to the main 
discourse. As explained in the reference/nomination section, parental rights include the legal 
authority to bring suit on the parents’ as well as on their children’s behalf (Rhoades, 2006, p. 
3). Such rights also include the ability to subject children to medical examination and decide 
whether or not the child will attend a public school (Rhoades, 2008, p. 895, 896). In its 
discussion of these rights, The Court cites multiple Supreme Court cases to support its 
arguments regarding the “liberty interest in the rearing and education of one's children” that 
the U.S. Constitution and other courts have repeatedly recognized within the parent-child 
relationship (Rhoades, 2008, p. 894. It also cites a 2000 U.S. Supreme Court case affirming 
“the fundamental right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody, control and 
upbringing of their children” (Rhoades, 2008, p. 911). In this, the Court confirms that 
parental authority is not just a contemporary federal right but a long-standing one based in 
the U.S. Constitution. Thus, parental power concerning students is established as primary 
compared to other persons or entities, including schools, which may affect students’ 
education or upbringing.  
In the discourse of parental authority relative to that of others interacting with 
students, the Rhoades opinions recounted the plaintiffs’ claims that the defendants’ actions 
constituted a “breach of parental interest” and noted that such allegations rest on “the breach 
of a duty not to interfere in the privacy of the familial relationship between Chelsea and her 
parents” (Rhoades, 2006, pp. 17-18). This statement further supports the idea that protection 
of parental authority is the primary power issue to be addressed. This statement also implies 
that the parent-child relationship is vulnerable to interference or disruption. The Court cites 
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previous cases to state that schools may interfere with parental authority by introducing 
certain topics to children before parents chose to do so (Rhoades, 2008, p. 898). As it relates 
to screening, The Court explicitly states its concern about testing in its selection of the 
following quotation from Merriken v. Cressman (364 F. Supp. 913, 922 (E.D. Pa. 1973), a 
case holding a school-administered survey unconstitutional: “School-sponsored counseling 
and psychological testing that pry into private family activities can overstep the boundaries 
of school authority and impermissibly usurp the fundamental rights of parents to bring up 
their children, as they are guaranteed by the Constitution” (Rhoades, 2008, p. 889). Also 
from Merriken, The Court states that, “public schools must not forget that "in loco parentis" 
does not mean "displace parents" (Rhoades, 2008, p. 889). Thus, not only are schools as an 
entity a potential interference with parental authority, but their various activities, including 
counseling and testing, may also be seen in encroaching upon parents’ authority over 
children. 
Not only is parental authority set out as a well-established right but also as a 
fundamental one, meaning it is afforded special protection in federal law. This special status 
creates a higher standard for protection. Without providing instruction on how The School 
may have protected this right within the context of screening program, The Court noted 
where The School’s actions fell short. Specifically, in discussing The School’s passive 
informed consent procedure, The Court posited that, although nine parents opted out of the 
program, the opt-out procedure as presented in the school newsletter “would be treated as 
‘junk mail’ in many households and quickly thrown out” (Rhoades, 2006, p. 4; 2008, p. 891, 
907). Additionally, as the Rhoades denied ever receiving such notice, their consent was not 
obtained (Rhoades, 2006, p. 4). This suggests that the screening program should have used 
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other informed consent methods, specifically ones that would insure receipt of the 
information and cause parents to attend to the communication and in the information 
provided therein. 
Regarding student power, as previously stated, in both opinions, Chelsea’s legal 
status is established via her relationship to her parents. In addressing the use of Chelsea’s 
name in the opinion, The Court stated that it is doing so because her parents have done so in 
their pleadings, suggesting that parents must waive her anonymity by using her name in 
public legal documents before others, including the student herself, may do so (Rhoades, 
2008, p. 890). Consequently, as an unemancipated minor, the student is subject upon her 
parents even in regards to the use of her own name. This indicates The Court intends to 
maintain a traditional view of children as completely under parental authority.  
The Court is consistent in its discourse of relative student power in its subsequent 
statements regarding parental consent (e.g., such consent’s being required before a minor can 
participate in evaluations requesting personal, private, or familial information), which also 
suggests that the student is unable to do so of own her accord (Rhoades, 2006, p. 12; 2008, p. 
890). The Court restates and does not rebut, thus implying at least some measure of 
agreement with, the plaintiffs’ statement that the application of this authority would remain 
unchanged “even if the TeenScreen had identified Chelsea as an imminent suicide risk and 
saved her life,” suggesting that an actual or potential benefit to the student, even of a serious 
magnitude such as preventing death, may be insufficient to overcome parental authority and 
the student’s inability to act independent of such authority (Rhoades, 2006, p. 12). 
In addition to students’ general inability to consent, The Court also discusses other 
aspects of student involvement in the program, particularly through participation in and 
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requesting information regarding the screening. The Court also questions, considering the 
circumstances under which Chelsea signed the assent, “whether she understood what she was 
signing” (Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). Specifically, The Court stated that although the form may 
have been read during the TeenScreen administration, she was not attending to the 
information, did not read the form, was not told the test was voluntary, was unclear about the 
purpose of the form, and her impression was that she was required to take the test (Rhoades, 
2008, p. 892). Thus, although Chelsea was a high school student with no known cognitive or 
learning deficits that would prevent her from reading or comprehending the information in 
the form, The Court discusses her as unwilling or unable to attend to or understand the 
information given her, which suggests that the students may be unwilling or unable to attend 
to instruction or to read and comprehend assent-related information. Additionally, in 
recounting the student’s perspective of the assent procedure, The Court shows that in 
reviewing questions of the validity of student assent the students’ experience of the process 
may be considered in determining legal violations. Regardless of the student’s degree of 
agency in such situations, The Court maintained that the School bore the responsibility of 
ensuring each student’s legally appropriate, individual comprehension of the assent process, 
which includes the student’s right to decline to participate in the activity. 
Further diminishing student power is the description of Chelsea after being told she 
had two mental disorders and could speak to a counselor or have her mother seek treatment 
for her as “very ‘upset and confused’ by this information and dwelled on it all day, becoming 
more upset the more the thought about it” (Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). This presents the student 
as emotionally unable to manage receipt of mental health information even for a brief time 
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without parental assistance. This also reinforces the presentation of students as needing 
parental protection from outside entities.  
Rhoades does not deem students completely powerless; however, The Court notes 
that students may refuse to participate in a screening program, but this right must be clearly 
communicated and understood by the student (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 902, 903). This suggests 
students may not be required to participate in screening programs, meaning such programs 
cannot be made mandatory. Additionally, applying state contract law, The Court likens the 
screening program to a contract that the student can void at any time, even after fulfilling the 
terms of the agreement, here, after completing the TeenScreen (Rhoades, 2008, p. 901). It is 
unclear what actions the student must take to void an agreement or how their terminating the 
agreement affects the management of the information they provided prior to termination; 
thus, the allowance for the student to end participation at any time further indicates The 
Court’s protection of the students option not to participate in screening. 
In contrast to the parents, who are presented as being uninvolved with the screening 
program, the Court’s discussion of The School’s power is focused on in its actions in creating 
and implementing the screening program. As previously explained, The Court in citing 
Merriken posits that school counseling and testing activities have the potential to interfere 
with parental authority. In comparison to this general reference, The Court notes particular 
activities over which The School exercised power. Specifically, The School was noted as 
collaborating with and accepting recommendations from community entities, incorporating 
screening into the curriculum, selecting the measure used in the screening program, preparing 
protocols for screening program, and arranging student scheduling for screening (Rhoades, 
2008, pp. 891-892). The School also selected and changed the processes for obtaining 
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informed consent for parents and developed the student assent procedure (Rhoades 2008, p. 
891). The School asserts that, as in C.N. and Fields, their actions were undertaken under its 
authority to direct its curriculum (Rhoades, 2008, p. 891). The Court notes that in those 
cases, the schools based the legality of their surveys, on their authority to manage their 
curricula, but this authority is limited and does not operate in isolation. First, as a 
governmental actor, the schools’ interest in obtaining “valuable health information” is 
balanced against disclosing private information (Rhoades, 2008, p. 899). This balance may 
tip in the government’s favor when, as in C.N. and Fields, such information is collected in 
the aggregate and personal information is highly protected (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 894, 899). 
Also, this authority may be abused where, as in C.N., the facts suggest student participation 
was coerced by threatening a cut in grades, requiring absent students to make up the survey, 
not allowing students to leave until they completing the survey, and parental rights are 
potentially violated by not seeking parental consent (Rhoades, 2008, p. 894). This statement 
indicates that although The Court acknowledged The School’s power to control its 
curriculum, such authority is relative to other rights, such as those related to private 
information, parental authority or voluntary student participation. Based on The Court’s 
analysis in Rhoades, it is possible that where these other rights are involved, particular facts 
regarding program development and logistics may be used to determine whether screening 
programming has overstepped a school’s limited authority by violating some other right.  
The School was also described in terms of its communicative power. Specifically, 
The Court noted The School’s ability to provide information about school-related activities, 
to solicit consent for student participation from parents and to use multiple attempts and 
various methods of communication such as newsletters or other correspondence and 
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(Rhoades, 2008, p. 891). The Court also noted the use of school personnel to prepare and 
disseminate parent correspondence and to inform and instruct teachers regarding the 
screening program (Rhoades, 2006, p. 4; 2008, p. 892). Additionally, in its discussion of C.N. 
and Fields, The Court noted that although such action would likely violate parental rights, a 
school may, by withholding information, misrepresent programming to parents (Rhoades, 
2008, p. 896). Thus, The School was considered the primary source of information about the 
screening program not only regarding to communication with parents but also in sharing 
information with and directing communications from teachers. This discourse on school 
communication indicates that The Court considered how The School used or refrained from 
using its ability to provide screening program information to parents and personnel.  
The Court’s discussion of the screening program prior to student participation 
focused on the lack of information given to students about the program. The Court noted that 
teachers were instructed not to tell their students about the TeenScreen (Rhoades, 2008, p. 
892). Also, the woman participating in the TeenScreen administration which Chelsea 
attended was described as instructing students to sign the form while withholding 
information that their participation was voluntary and of their right not to participate 
(Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). The woman was also reported as telling students “to be as quick as 
possible,” which may be interpreted as removing the opportunity for students to review, 
question, and understand the meaning of their assent (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 892, 903). The 
Court also noted that the student assent form contained a typographical error in that the 
contact information for the project coordinator, who was to be contacted with questions or 
concerns about the TeenScreen, was omitted (Rhoades, 2008, p. 903). This suggests The 
School should have taken additional care in providing information to students involved in the 
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screening, particularly as it relates to ensuring student understanding of assent, providing 
sufficient time for students to ask questions about their participation, and providing accurate 
contact information in documentation provided to students about screening.  
Argumentation (topoi) 
As part of her historical discourse approach, Wodak (2001) developed a list of 15 
topoi, or argumentation strategies, frequently used in discourse to support arguments for or 
against particular conclusions to proposed social problems. Of these 15 strategies, my 
analysis of the Rhoades discourse found The Court made use of the following topoi: 
law/right, history, numbers, responsibility, definition or name-interpretation, usefulness or 
advantage, and danger or threat.  
The topos of law or right is the argument that an action should be permitted or 
omitted if a law or codified norm prescribes or forbids the action (Wodak, 2001). The topoi 
of history is that because history shows that actions have specific consequences, an action 
should be performed or omitted if it is comparable to the historical example referenced 
(Wodak). In its discussion of how the screening program violated the Rhoades’ parental 
rights, The Court uses a combined law/right and history argument by stating that “The 
Supreme Court has recognized for almost 100 years that the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment encompasses a liberty interest in the rearing and education of one's 
children” and immediately thereafter citing the 2000 case of Troxel v. Granville, in 
conjunction with the older Supreme Court cases of Carey v. Population Services, Intern 
(1977), Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska, (1923) (Rhoades, 2008, 
pp. 894, 897). The Court acknowledges The School’s legal obligation to educate its students 
and that this duty was asserted by defendants and affirmed by the courts in C.N. and Fields; 
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however, The Court cites Merriken (1973), Pierce (1925), and Yoder (1923) to support its 
argument that The School’s duty to educate is limited by the parents’ privacy interest in and 
authority over the student (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 894-896). 
The Court does not use history independently, but law/right is used to support its 
analysis and conclusions regarding each issue presented for resolution. In the 2006 opinion, 
these topoi are used to analyze the question of whether The School’s screening program 
should be defined as medical malpractice or whether the plaintiffs should be awarded 
emotional distress damages, and the judge concluded that this is unclear (Rhoades, 2006, pp. 
12-13, 15). In addition to the abovementioned discussion of parental rights, the 2008 opinion 
also applies law to discussions of (a) the conditions under which The School as a 
governmental entity may access private information; (b) whether The School’s program was 
voluntary and confidential; (c) screening participation as a contract, which the minor may 
void at any time; and (d) The School’s inability to require student participation in “a personal 
analysis, evaluation, or survey not directly related to academic instruction” (Rhoades, 2008, 
pp. 889-902).  
In addressing the complexity of these issues, The Court uses a variation of the 
potentially fallacious numbers argument that an action should be performed or omitted if the 
numbers prove a specific topos; this argument can be flawed when drawn from presumed but 
not empirically verified, majorities (Wodak, 2001). Specifically, The Court uses this 
argument in discussing The School’s active consent procedure noting, “only nine parents 
returned the forms consenting to having their children take the TeenScreen” and its 
discussion of the subsequent passive consent procedure noting that although 23 opt-out forms 
were returned, most parents would respond to passive consent in newsletter as junk mail 
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(Rhoades, 2008, p. 891). The Court also notes a lack of numerical information provided by 
the School regarding 94 students who did not participate in the screening, particularly the 
reasons for their non-participation (Rhoades, pp. 902-903, 909). In its discourse on the 
individual liability of school employees The Court states, “It took this court nearly twenty 
pages to analyze and determine whether the facts of this case . . . establish the violation of a 
Constitutional right” Rhoades, p. 911). Thus, The Court consistently used numbers, or the 
lack thereof, to support its concerns regarding the use of passive informed consent and the 
voluntariness of student participation in the screening program. 
The topos of responsibility is that if an entity is responsible for a specific problem, it 
should act to find solutions to that problem (Wodak, 2001). In Rhoades, the problems as 
presented by plaintiffs are that The School’s screening program impinged upon the parents’ 
interest in the child’s interest and upbringing by not obtaining the parents’ written consent 
(Rhoades, 2006, p. 17; 2008, p. 890). The defendants asserted consent was obtained using the 
passive consent procedure and that Chelsea’s participation was voluntary (Rhoades, 2006, p. 
17; 2008, p. 890). Ultimately, The Court held that the overall program violated the Rhoades’ 
parental rights and did so by recounting the actions making The School responsible, such as 
inviting and collaborating with the Center and its personnel, selecting the informed consent 
procedure, and using insufficient methods to inform parents of the screening program 
(Rhoades, 2008, pp. 891-892). Regarding individual school employee responsibility arising 
from their various program-related activities, The Court also details their various activities, 
but in its final conclusion holds that it is unclear “whether a reasonable state actor would 
have understood that his or her actions were unlawful" (Rhoades, pp. 891-892, 911). Thus, 
80 
 
school employee actions were used for their contribution to The School’s responsibility for 
the program, but not to generate individual employee liability. 
The Center’s responsibility for the problem is presented via its relationship with the 
school (Rhoades, 2006, p. 3). Specifically, The Court discusses The Center’s contribution to 
the problem as including its representative failing to ensure voluntary and knowing student 
assent and failing to maintain student confidentiality in the screening program adequately 
(Rhoades, 2006, p. 2; 2008, p. 892); however, these actions were discussed as problematic 
not because of the entity performing them but because of how the facts surrounding then 
resulted in a violation of parental rights. Thus, regardless of whether The School or its agent 
performed the actions contributing to a breach of confidentiality, in combination, the actions 
resulted in a breach of the Rhoades’ federal privacy rights.  
In neither opinion is the student discussed as having any responsibility or contributing 
in any way to the problem of a violation of rights. For example, in its presentation of 
Chelsea’s recollection of her (in)actions during the administration (i.e., her not attending to 
the information, signing the form without reading it, and not asking any questions of the 
person administering the TeenScreen), The Court is silent as to whether any of these facts 
would mitigate The School or Center’s responsibility to ensure voluntary and knowing 
participation (Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). That the balance of responsibility lies outside of the 
student likely stems from her status an “unemancipated minor,” which implies that some 
other person or entity is responsible for her (Rhoades, 2006, p. 3). In this instance, The Court 
concludes such responsibility rests with The School and/or The Center as collaborators in the 
screening program. 
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The topos of definition or name-interpretation is also used in Rhoades. Under this 
argument, if an action, a thing, or a person is named/designated as X, then it carries or should 
carry the qualities, traits, or attributes contained in the meaning of X (Wodak, 2001). In its 
discussion of Chelsea’s participation in the screening program, The Court consistently 
applies a presumption of a lack of responsibility because of her designation as a minor 
(Rhoades, 2008, p. 892). This unchanging definition helps simplify the discourse by 
removing one party from potential liability. It also works to assign responsibility to an entity 
other than the student.  
Use of the topos definition creates challenges for The Court’s analysis. For example, 
the plaintiffs allege medical malpractice, but The Court says it has an “initial reluctance to 
conclude that every claim in the complaint is a claim for medical malpractice, simply 
because the TeenScreen program is involved” (Rhoades, 2006, pp. 12-13). This suggests The 
Court may consider TeenScreen a medical process or procedure but is unsure if this is an 
accurate designation. Also, in discussing the TeenScreen instrument The Court is clear that it 
differs from those used in C.N. and Fields because it was used to screen “for emotional 
health concerns” and to collect individual as opposed to aggregate data, but it does not 
proceed to clarify whether the TeenScreen is the type of analysis, evaluation, or survey that 
state law prohibits from mandatory participation; instead it addresses whether the facts 
indicate its administration was voluntary (Rhoades, 2008, pp. 892, 898-899). 
The topos of usefulness or advantage is that if an action will be useful then one 
should perform it (Wodak, 2001). The Court states that the screening program was developed 
in response to student suicide as part of a larger suicide prevention program and that The 
School’s administration was a pilot of the program, implying that the program was created to 
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benefit the Penn-Harris students and possibly other students throughout the state (Rhoades, 
2008, p. 891, 899). The Court does not discuss this goal as problematic; however, its 
statements regarding parental rights and its discussion of those rights to the child’s 
benefit/advantage of having parents making important decisions indicates that benefits to 
student health are outweighed by the benefit/advantage of maintaining parental rights 
(Rhoades, 2006, pp. 17-18). 
The topos of danger or threat is that if an action has specific dangerous or threatening 
consequences, one should not perform it or should do something against such consequences 
(Wodak, 2001). In the 2006 opinion’s discussion of parental rights, The Court notes that “as 
a hypothetical, even if the TeenScreen had identified Chelsea as an imminent suicide risk and 
saved her life, plaintiffs' claim would be the same;” thus the potentially averted danger or 
threat of teen suicide is presented as insufficient to overcome the protection or value imbued 
to parental authority (Rhoades, 2006, p. 12).  
The Court also accesses this topos in reference to The School’s argument that liability 
should be shared with The Center. Specifically, in its NAMBLA example, The Court states 
that if a student is emotionally or physically harmed The School may bear responsibility for 
the actor causing the harm (Rhoades, 2008, p. 906). Thus, the Court simultaneously connects 
the harm a student may suffer from a screening program to that of a child being sexually 
molested and maintains that it is The School’s responsibility to protect students from such 
potential harm. 
Multidisciplinarity 
The Court’s approach to multidisciplinarity is presented both in its general 
presentation of the case and its discussion of parental involvement in the screening program’s 
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design and implementation. As to the case presentation, the 2008 Rhoades opinion describes 
the formation and composition of the task force and its collaboration with The School (pp. 
890-891); however, its discussion does not include the various documents submitted by The 
School with its Brief in Support of its motion for summary judgment to evidence the 
scientific and state data used to support the task force and School’s program development 
including a statewide study of student suicide, academic articles on school-community 
screening collaboration, and suicide prevention program guidelines and references 
(Defendants Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment). That neither these, nor any 
other documents from any other disciplines outside of legal texts, were included in The 
Court’s discourse suggests that only, or primarily, legal concepts were used to guide the 
discussion and reach conclusions regarding the screening program. This reflects a centrist, as 
opposed to pluralist or integrationist, perspective to the issues presented (van Leeuwen, 
2005). 
According to the defendants’ pleadings, the parents of the Penn-Harris student who 
committed suicide were involved in the task force, which collaborated with the School in 
creating the screening program (Defendants Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment). This indicates that parents and their authority were used in collaboration with 
other entities; however, this involvement was omitted from the case opinions. Specifically, 
The Court’s discourse limits parental involvement to the passive receipt of information from 
the School, parental opting out of the program, and the Rhoades’ objections to the program 
(Rhoades, 2006, p. 3; 2008, p. 890). This suggests that The Court views parental authority as 
only independent from, or incapable of collaborating with other entities affecting student 
health.  
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In sum, in the two Rhoades opinions, The Court’s use of reference/nomination, 
organization of relative power relationships, and selection of topoi are each consistent with 
the legal system’s long-standing perspective of parental rights in the context of public 
education. Specifically, The Court groups the various entities at issue in Rhoades in a way 
that sets the students and her parents as a unit whose rights are irreversibly connected to each 
other; the alleged violation of the parents’ rights arise from the facts related to the child, and 
the child’s rights must be asserted by the parents. In comparison, although The Center is 
discussed as an agent of The School, The School is referenced as an independent entity, by 
its affiliation The Center administering the screening, and, grouped by analogy with an 
organization advocating pedophilia. Thus, The Court’s discusses The School’s potential legal 
liability for the screening program as based on its own and it’s agents (in)action and as a 
potential source of harm to students if its activities and personnel are not carefully selected 
and monitored. Additionally, The Court uses reference/nomination to categorize the present 
case relative to legal concepts from previous and current case law and statutory law. 
Specifically, The Court maintains the existing legal perspective that schools may manage 
their curricula but also discusses its concerns, regarding whether The School’s efforts at 
confidentiality adequately protected the parents’ and students’ rights to privacy and whether 
student participation was truly voluntary. 
The Court’s discussion of power relationships also reflects a divide between the 
parent-student unit and The School. The Court discusses parental authority over children in 
terms of the parents’ as protectors of students’ rights and well-being and specifically singles 
out counseling and testing as potentially interfering with this relationship and interest. 
Because of their status, parents are presented as the recipients of school screening program 
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information with The School having the obligation to communicate student-related 
information and obtain parental consent for screening in ways that ensure receipt and 
comprehension. Similarly, because the student has no independent power but derives it from 
the parental relationship, student assent for screening is also discussed as requiring care in 
communication and procurement, particularly ensuring student participation follows clear 
information about and purely voluntary engagement. 
In support of its various arguments, The Court’s uses the following of Wodak’s 
(2001) topoi: history, particularly, the legal system’s historical perspective on parental rights; 
law/right, specifically, recent cases addressing parental rights in the context of public school 
activities; numbers in support of questions regarding The School’s passive consent 
procedure; responsibility of the entities to each other in conducting the screening program; 
definition or name-interpretation as related to limited student power and The Court’s 
challenges in classifying screening relative to other testing; and the general 
usefulness/advantage of screening relative to the danger/threat of such programs to parental 
rights. Each of these topoi are presented in either the plaintiffs’ or the defendants’ documents 
submitted to The Court; however, the defendants’ efforts to broaden the screening discourse 
by using a more specific topos of benefit by explaining and submitting documentation 
regarding teen suicide as a local and national mental health concern are not incorporated into 
either of the Rhoades decisions.  
By not addressing the information provided by the defendants’ regarding student 
mental health challenges and interventions The Court applies a centrist approach to the 
multidisciplinary issue of screening. Specifically, its discussion of the case facts includes a 
statement that the impetus for the screening program was a student suicide, which The Court 
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describes as a tragedy, but there is no discussion of suicide as a mental health problem nor is 
screening discussed as a means of addressing this or any other student mental health concern. 
Specifically, student well-being is discussed as an interest contained solely contained within 
and to be adjudicating using the legal concept of parental authority; there is no discussion of 
screening as a collaboration between schools and parents, an intervention sharing the goal of 
student well-being with parents, or as a matter related to areas outside of law such as public 
health or psychology. 
Discussion 
The U.S. legal system places a high value on parental rights (Gelman, 2005; Stanley 
v. Illinois, 1972). Although the strategies and concepts Rhoades used for grouping varied, the 
goal of the discourse was to address the issues related to the legality of the defendants’ 
actions, specifically whether The School’s screening program violated the Rhoades’ parental 
rights. Throughout the Rhoades opinions, discussions of informed consent, student assent, 
and confidentiality were framed by their actual or perceived effects on these rights. Thus, 
The Court maintained the value of parental rights as paramount in keeping with multiple 
prior decisions including the aforementioned Supreme Court parental rights cases and 
Merriken. This hierarchy of rights is based on the assumption that parental rights consider, or 
are at least aware of, students’ best interests; it does not consider the possibility that this may 
not be so. It is unknown how many parents are aware of or consider how unmet educational 
and mental health needs affect various student life outcomes. Such awareness requires 
information regarding educational and psychological functioning that many parents, due to 
their lack of access to such information, do not have. Assuming parents have this awareness, 
should they decide not to act to meet these needs, students or other concerned adults with 
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access to students are limited in their ability to connect students to needed resources. In many 
areas of the county, there are insufficient community or public resources to meet student 
educational and mental health needs, and many families in underserved populations are 
unable to access local resources due to lack of financial or healthcare resources. Thus, 
students, particularly those with the most need, and others who may be aware of and able to 
assist them in meeting their educational and mental health needs, are severely constrained by 
current legal perspectives viewing parents rights as more worthy of protection than student 
health needs.  
 Rhoades’ discussion of parental authority was consistently connected to concerns 
about how The School communicated information about the screening program to parents 
and students. Thus, schools may be expected to communicate with parents in ways reflective 
of their authority. While The Court did not expressly require the use of an active consent 
procedure and did not impose liability upon the school because it could not have known its 
actions were illegal, it found that the administration of the TeenScreen test violated the 
Rhoades’ right to privacy. Post-Rhoades, it is unlikely that some courts will hold schools 
blameless for utilizing implied consent procedures in mental health screening in which 
familial and relational information is sought. This also limits students’ opportunities to seek 
and obtain educational and mental health services to those parents deem worthy of attention. 
Even if schools used active consent procedures, this may not increase parents’ knowledge, 
understanding, or appreciation of student mental health needs. Where parents opt not to read 
or consider SBMHS information provided, students would be constrained from participating 
in school-interventions that may alert school personnel or parents to student educational and 
mental health needs. This would result in a default to the current processes of service 
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provision that require students’ needs be so severe as to merit teacher referral for special 
education services, which may or may not be the most efficient or appropriate means of 
addressing student needs. In keeping with parental authority, screening need not be 
automatically linked to the provision of services; post-screening, parents could be notified of 
screening results and recommended interventions requiring parental consent. This would 
allow parents to make decisions about student services with knowledge of their students’ 
particular needs. In contrast, The Court’s preservation of parental control by requiring active 
consent for screening participation prevents parents from obtaining the information needed to 
make decisions about student services and, consequently, prevents children from obtaining 
services. 
In the variety of argumentation strategies used, at no point was the student discussed 
as responsible for any actions contributing to the issues presented for resolution. She was, 
however, discussed as unable to voluntarily participate without parental consent and without 
appropriate provision of information by screening personnel. Thus, adequate parental consent 
and students assent procedures are necessary to facilitate student voluntariness. This 
limitation on student autonomy results in limited access to resources, prevents students from 
alerting potentially helpful others of their needs, and continues student vulnerability to 
various negative life outcomes that may have been averted with appropriate intervention. 
The Court also devoted discussion to the individuals involved in the TeenScreen 
administration and in the handling and conveying of the screener’s results, particularly their 
contributions to breaching the student’s confidentiality and the parents’ privacy rights. 
Merriment raised similar concerns about the competence of persons involved in its program. 
The mental health field has changed since 1971; school and other types of psychologists, and 
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master’s-level counselors attending accredited programs receive extensive didactic and 
clinical training in psychological issues relevant to school-aged children (American 
Psychological Association, 1987). Additionally, many psychiatrists now limit their work to 
the medication management aspects of mental health and rarely engage in therapy, or as 
termed in Merriken, psychotherapy (Olfson, Marcus, & Pincus, 1999); however, the 
discourse in Rhoades suggests that courts will use mistakes or errors in judgments made by 
personnel involved in screening programs as factors in determining liability.   
In Rhoades, The Court expressed concern about the program’s relationship to medical 
malpractice. It also used various terms in describing the TeenScreen. Merriken presented a 
similar issue in its court’s discussion about that test’s psychometric properties and the 
soundness of the empirical or theoretical basis upon which conclusions were made about the 
test results, and the lack of relationship between the test and general program goals. This 
suggests a lack of familiarity with concepts or terms outside of legal practice consistent with 
a centrist perspective. In combination, The Court’s lack of information or understanding of 
the personnel and assessment logistics of screening supports its maintenance of parental 
rights as the ultimate protector of student wellbeing. To entrust student educational or mental 
health needs to poorly trained individuals or poorly designed instrumental would not serve 
students’ best interest; however, The Court’s discussion of this issues suggests that legal 
systems lack sufficient knowledge or understanding of these processes, which occur outside 
of the legal system. Were The Court more accurately apprised of the personnel and 
measurement logistics of the screening program at issue, it may have arrived at a different 
conclusion; perhaps one more amenable to meeting student needs. In this case, a lack of 
clarifying information may have contributed to the creation of legal precedent, which limits 
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schools ability to, or serves to make schools less likely to, implement screening programs 
that could work to meet well-established student educational and mental health needs. Thus, 
in communicating programming information related to other student health needs, such as 
vision screening and weight management, schools considering SBMHS should take 
particular care to regularly keep parents, students, school personnel, and perhaps even the 
public at large informed of these needs, of the perils of not addressing such needs, and of the 
interventions available to facilitate student wellbeing. Such information campaigns may 
increase parental support for such programs and facilitate schools’ ability to better address 
student needs. 
Implications 
In implementing screening programs, schools should understand how courts may 
review the facts arising from their program in light of prior cases and how various program 
participants may be categorized to determine liability. In addition to federal law, familiarity 
with relevant state law on consent, assent, and psychological evaluations, or procedures 
categorized as evaluations is essential to understanding potential screening program liability.  
As discussed in Rhoades, how student capacity to consent and mental health information are 
described within relevant statutes may determine whether the solicitation of such information 
requires active parental consent. Considering the emphasis Rhoades placed on 
communication with parents, schools should take special care to communicate clearly 
information about screening programs and their privacy protections to parents. 
Also, considering Rhoades discussion of C.N. and Ridgewood, the legal requirements 
for obtaining informed consent in SBMHS programs may vary based on, not only the 
jurisdiction in which research is conducted, but also how data are used. When student data 
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obtained from SBMHS are used anonymously in the aggregate, courts may be more likely to 
approve of an implied consent procedure; however, when such factors are absent, passive 
consent may be viewed skeptically. Where schools seek to implement community or group-
level screening to assess and intervene at these levels, passive informed consent procedures 
with an opt-out provision may be permissible. In cases where schools face particularly 
problematic issues related to school climate and academic outcomes, this may bolster 
arguments that screening meets a compelling state interest. In contrast, for individual-level 
screening, active consent is likely more appropriate. In either scenario, parents should receive 
adequate information regarding the process, goals, risks and benefits of such programs, and 
the use of screening data in clear terms and in advance of program implementation (National 
Academy of Sciences, 2009). 
Rhoades discussion of C.N. and Ridgewood should also alert schools to the possibility 
that simply incorporating screening program in the curriculum may provide insufficient 
protection from liability. Schools should provide a clear link between their screening 
program and some academic purpose. Where this connection is not clearly established or 
communicated to parents or students, courts may be less likely to defer to the school’s, as 
opposed to parental, authority. 
Additionally, it must be emphasized that some states and federal laws specifically 
require written consent for the release of private information, denote the form that such 
releases must take, and specify the procedures deemed appropriate for the release of such 
information (Sales, Miller & Hall, 2005). Written consent usually creates a presumption that 
the consent is legally valid (Jones, 1990). However, despite the presumption of the validity of 
written consent, because of the sensitive nature of the information sought and the power 
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imbalance between students and schools, as in Rhoades, courts may not view a minor’s 
written consent as sufficient (Redding, 1993). 
Lastly, although The School attempted to broaden the discourse on screening by 
providing various sources of information, including academic texts, the Rhoades discussion 
reflected a centrist perspective on this admittedly complex multidisciplinary issue. While 
attempts to convey psychological or other knowledge relevant to screening in legal setting 
may meet with similar results, schools and mental health professionals working in school 
should take care to explain and communicate concepts that, if not understood, may lead to 
misunderstanding about the process and purpose of screening program and information.  
These findings are affected by several limitations. First, compared to other qualitative 
methodologies, the discourse historical approach derives from critical discourse analysis, a 
relatively modern evolving multitheoretical, multimethod approach to qualitative research 
(Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). While this allows for flexibility in its application, it also makes 
it difficult to clearly delineate and communicate the research method to readers in a way that 
may be more easily understood because of its similarity to more established or well-known 
research methodologies. A similar challenge exists regarding DHA’s use of context in 
explaining study results. Although the reasoning for providing as complete a context for the 
social problem explored as possible is that such background is essential to understanding the 
development and maintenance of the problem examined, such in-depth descriptions can 
provide a copious amounts of information for the reader to comprehend in addition to that 
presented in the study itself (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). Where, as in this analysis, such 
context requires explanation of multiple contexts, which have little terminology or methods 
of analysis in common, both the researcher and the reader must commit to investing the 
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additional time and effort needed to comprehend and adequately address each area presented. 
Such additional investment of resources makes DHA a particularly challenging approach to 
clearly implement and communicate as compared to more unitary or homogenous research 
methods that do not require explanation or use of multiple perspectives. This case study 
focused on a single case arising from one student’s experiences in one jurisdiction. As there 
are no other cases addressing this issue, it is unclear how multiple students being affected 
would change a court’s analysis, if another jurisdiction would arrive at different conclusions. 
Lastly, as this is the first study to explore a legal analysis of screening using a discourse 
historical analysis, additional studies are needed to explore this methodology’s applicability 
to school-related discourse. 
Conclusion 
The potential benefits of school based mental health programs and the links between 
children’s mental health and various outcomes are well-documented (Masten & Coatsworth, 
1998; New Freedom Commission on Mental Health, 2003). However, the implementation of 
school-based mental health screening programs is complicated by the debate over the utility 
and consequences of such programs and their relationships to parental rights in the context of 
education. Schools must determine whether the benefits of screening compared to the risks of 
not screening at least equal the resources needed for informed consent planning. These 
decisions should be made in collaboration between school officials, legal counsel, and mental 
health professionals. Complying with the legal requirements for informed consent will 
require significant and continuous effort.  
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